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I. INTRODUCTION
"At stake here is nothing less than the future of the computer memory
industry."1 So began Infineon's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court to
hear appeal of the decision by the Federal Circuit in Rambus v. Infineon.2 Allowing
for hyperbole often associated with a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
that case does present a prism through which to consider the issues that surround
participation by private entities in standard-setting organizations (SSO) and the
viability of the current model for treatment of intellectual property issues. The
day following the Supreme Court's announcement of the denial of Infineon's writ
of certiorari, Rambus' stock spiked,3 and Infineon's stock tumbled.'
In another recent case, discussed in Part III of this Article, infra the stakes
were high as well. In the wake of a standard-setting process to identify a low
emissions gasoline formulation for use in California, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) alleged that Union Oil of California (Unocal) restrained trade
by participating in the standard-setting process and enforcing its patents for
reformulated gasoline despite its "willful" refusal to inform a state agency and two
industry councils of those interests.5 The royalties could amount to $500 million
annually.6
These cases arose in a process that serves significant economic and
technological interests. There is a consensus recognizing the value of standardsetting, the process by which manufacturers and others join voluntarily to identify
a potential for interoperability, efficiency, and reliability in manufacture or use.
Standard-settingis a catalyst speeding technological development and contributing
silently, but dramatically, to our economic well-being. With these benefits come
an array of legal issues, intensified by standard-setting's location at the intersection
of intellectual property law and antitrust law.
A quick reference to current law reviews and journals reveals that the subject
of standard-setting organizations and their relationship to intellectual property law

' Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 3, Infmeon Tech. AG v. Rambus, No. 03-37, cert. denied
124 S. Ct. 227 (2003)..
2 Rambus, Inc. v. Infmeon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
3 Karen Talley, Abreast ofthe Market: Rambus Rockets 38% as Court Clears Way to Collect on Patent,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 7, 2003, at C3.
' Shawn W. Crispin, World Stock Markets: Krung Thai CreditQuay Is Wory, WALL ST. J., Oct.
8, 2003, at C16.
- Complaint of the FTC at 15-16, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
6 Answer of Union Oil Co. of Cal. at 12, Inre Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 21,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

3

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7

J. INTELL PROP. L

[Vol. 12:163

and antitrust law has captivated today's legal scholars. That captivation reflects
the inherently complex issues and the economic stakes. Participation by owners
ofintellectual property in these standard-setting organizations carries with it many
benefits, for themselves and for the U.S. economy, and many risks. Patentees
whose technology is chosen for a standard see the immediate inflation of the
value of their patents. However, those patentees also see that otherwise accepted,
expected, and legal conduct takes on a new, riskier character.
Under current law, a company participating in a private standard-setting
process assumes the risk of loss of its right to enforce patents or other intellectual
property rights implicated in the standard. That company could be found liable
for antitrust violations, carrying with it the risk of treble damages and attorney
fees. On the other hand, participants run the risk of being sued for infringement
of patents owned by another participant as well as being implicated in the
standard.
The owners of intellectual property rights, the manufacturers of the resulting
products, consumers, and the economy will be best served by the identification
of a model that allows the effective operation of standard-setting organizations
and yet minimizes or negates the risks that are associated with participation in
standard-setting.
In this Article, I propose a radical solution to the standard-setting dilemma.
Part II of this Article investigates standard-setting, standard-setting organizations,
and the law surrounding them. Part III describes the standard-setting dilemma,
including the three widely known and most relevant current instances in which
patent holders have been accused of violating conditions of participation in
standard-setting organizations. Part IV reviews the current literature, offering
proposals for resolving the dilemma and determines that those proposals are
deficient for all involved. Finally, in Part V, I present a model for the conditions
of participating in standard-setting that offers substantial benefits over current
practice. This model departs significantly from the current norms, but adoption
of this model will enhance the standard-setting process by making it more
effective and will diminish the uncertainties that accompany that process today.
Adoption of this model will make the standard-setting process less subject to
manipulation, litigation, and antitrust concerns. The owners of intellectual
property who elect to participate in standard-setting processes will enjoy the fruits
of their labor with little or no risk to their ability to enforce their rights as a result
of that participation. Yet, the possible inequities in royalty valuation and
infringement suits against participants which practice the standard will not occur.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss1/7

4

Webb: There Is a Better Way: It's Time to Overhaul the Model for Partic

2004]

OVERHAULING THE STANDARD-SETTING MODEL

167

II. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
A. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS AS A CATALYST FOR TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT

This is the age of "the ever-whirling wheel of change," 7 in which technological
change is occurring at a pace unlike any other time in the history of the world.'
Just one year before the Wright Brothers launched their flying machine in 1903,
Marconi severed the dependence on physical connection by broadcasting across
the Atlantic Ocean.9 Merely twenty years later, Zworykin and Farnsworth, among
others, moved the world towards television.' Ten years later, J.V. Atanasoff
conceived and built the first electronic computer." About that time, William

Shockley succeeded in reducing diodes to transistors.' 2 After another twenty
years, Robert Noyce andJack Kilby each further refined the transistor by devising
the integrated circuit, opening the way for the personal computer.' 3 With the
passage of another ten years,J.C.R. Licklider, Leonard Kleinrock, Ray Tomlinson,
and their colleagues devised ARPANET, inaugurating the Internet. 4 Twenty
years later, Tim Bernes-Lee and others devised the World Wide Web."
There are many examples of the way in which private standards improve
American lives: (1) in standards for the manufacture and maintenance of
automobiles,' (2) in a national code used by local jurisdictions in defining the17
minimum standards for various trades in residential and commercial buildings,

7 EDMUND SI'F.NsI I,THI.F,\F.IIF QU- F.N, Book VII (Mutabilitie), Canto VI, Stanza
I ("The
ever-whirling Wheel Of Change; the which of all mortal things doth sway."). This is infinitely more
apropos now than when Spenser wrote this phrase more than four hundred years ago.

,
HAR(IlD
Seegeneral#

EvANS

.\1..,

THFi.

MADi)F; AMI.RICA, FRo(M THESI{n\

ENGINEI

THF SIARCH EN(;IN:: TW() CI.NTURIIU; 01F INN( )VVI.ORS (2004).

18 T~i- EN(:Y(:I.oI,'.I)I,\ ANIU:IIAN,\ 304 (2003) (Grolier Inc. Int'l ed., 2003).

26 id. at 447-48.
ENCYCLO.P.DIA 01; CO)MII'IR S(:IINCI 109-10 (Anthony Ralston et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000).
,2 Id. at 892-93.

Id. at 1251.
14 Id. at 916.

" Id.at 1869. For his achievement, Mr. Bemers-Lee has been knighted by Queen Elizabeth and
recently received the $1.2 million first Millennium Technology Prize of the Finnish Technology
Award Foundation.
" See, e.g., So(]'Y oi; AuTlo. EN;'RS, MECHANICAL, AND MAIu,\J, RI1QUIRNIgENTS [OR
Exr.RNA H,.Y THRI.AD.I) F,\S'II-.NI.,RS, Doc. No. J429 (1999), available at http://www.sae.org/.
17 B.Ix;. OIIIcI,\I.S & CoDi ADMI'RS, NxIONAl, BUilDING CODI. COIPIIANCI MANUAL:
1996 BOCA N,\iI )N,\I Bui .DIN; C )D1 (13th ed. 1996).
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(3) in registration of domain names in operation of the internet,"s and (4) in
standards for many of the essential components of personal computers.' 9
To put the significance of standard-setting in a perspective, consider how
much more convenient it would be to purchase a standard ink cartridge for your
printer. Rather than being held captive to the original manufacturer of a printer,
consumers would be able to find a generic cartridge and reap the benefits of
competition based upon the materials, not the patented design of the original
manufacturer. Standard-setting provides the opportunity for interoperability,
consumer convenience, and enhanced price competition. 20
The adoption of a single standard for an aspect of technology allows research
and development to focus on evasive areas of technology and allows the market
to focus competition on those other areas. 21 Standard-setting spurs technological
progress and increases interoperability among competing brands. Interoperability,
in turn, provides consumers with enhanced confidence in their purchasing
decisions.2 They are less likely to be marginalized by the purchase of one brand
over another. That is, increased interoperability means that a consumer's choice
of one manufacturer's product over another is less likely to confine her to that
manufacturer's accessories or replacement parts.
Three different means have evolved for setting-standards. First, standardsetting can occur de facto when one source dominates the marketplace. The
dominating company calls the technological tune. Its competitors are forced to
seek licenses or work around the development. That domination will continue
until a competitor-David succeeds in creating a substitute technology to defeat
Goliath. Goliath, however, risks antitrust liability if it overplays its hand 3 or

18

Registry Agreement between Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and

Network Solutions Inc. (May 25, 2004), availabk at http://www.icann.org/dds/agreements/
verisign/registry-agmt-org-25may01 .htm.
19 SeeVIDEOELEcS. STANDARDS AS'N,VESA DIGITAL FLATPANEL STANDARD (ver. 11999),
available at http://www.vesa.org/summary/sumdfp.htm.
0 One may argue that the profit realized from the sale of printer ink cartridges allows companies
to offer their printers at lower prices than would be the case if there were an industry standard for
a common printer cartridge.

21 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Poliy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1603-07
(2003) ("A growing number of economists and legal scholars have focused on cumulative
innovation, in which a final product results not just from an initial invention, but from one or more
improvements to that invention.").
' See Patrick D. Curran, Standard-SettingOtganiZations: Patents,PriceFixin and PerSe Legaliy, 70

U. CHI. L. REv. 983, 984-91 (2003) (discussing the benefits of private standard-setting
interoperability, network effects, innovation, and its critical relationship to research and
development).
23 David A. Balto, Standard Setting in a Network Economy, Speech before Cutting Edge
Antitrust Law Seminars International (Feb. 17, 2000), transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/other/standardsetting.htm (discussing leveraging as a means by which a monopolist
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attempts to use its dominance in one field to dominate related markets by illegally
limiting competition. 24
In the presence of a monopoly, the consumer is likely to pay more for goods
than if there were competition." With the absence of competition, the increased
price will be the highest price the market will bear. The de facto means is not the
most efficient means to set a standard. The dominating party is likely to choose
a standard that maintains its primacy and maximizes its profits. The chosen
standard will only be the most effective or least expensive alternative by
coincidence.
A second means of standard-setting occurs through the exercise of
governmental power, often in areas of consumer protection, health, or safety
concerns. This form of standard-setting takes place at all levels of government
and emanates from powers conferred by constitution, statute, or regulation.
Governmental bodies either generate their own standard or adopt a standard that
is the product of a private' standard-setting organization. In either case,
depending upon the significance of or controversy surrounding the standard,
governmental bodies will use either open, formal administrative processes,26 or
informal processes intended to allow all those affected to voice their views. Such
processes are designed to achieve the best result by relying on objectivity and
either the absence of competing interests or the identification and balancing of
competing interests.
While considering an example of the governmental form, this Article focuses
on the third means-private standard-setting. Private standard-setting is the
process by which manufacturers and others join voluntarily and deliberate over
a standard. By its nature, this process is relatively free from direct governmental
regulation.27
Private standard-setting offers advantages over de facto and governmental
standard-setting. Private standard-setting combines broad participation by
interested parties who would be affected by the standard, mirroring the

protects its market dominance in one area by (1) bundling its product to the next generation product
or (2) manipulating standards, particularly interfaces, to exclude competitors).
24 Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)).
25 Some scholars advocate that a monopoly is the best model to assure economic efficiency. See,
e.g., David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, IntellectualProperty andAntitrust: GeneralPnndpes, 43
IDEA 395, 412-15 (2003); Burk & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1601-06 (discussing the theories of
Joseph A. Schumpeter and Edmund W. Kitch). Balto and Wolman's work is a comprehensive study
of antitrust considerations.
26 E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551-559, 701-706 (2000); Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (2000).
7 Some scholars have proposed interposing some form of governmental intervention. See infra
Part IV (discussing current proposals).
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governmental means. In addition, private standard-setting provides a relative
freedom from political influences often associated with governmental action.
Private standard-setting also offers flexibility in time and method that may not be
present in governmental standard-setting. The private standard-setting process
is usually overseen by a Standard Setting Organization (SSO). Those
organizations protect their role by adopting the processes and requiring
conditions of participation intended to assure objectivity and freedom from
domination by one participant.
Private standard-setting not only has a place in our modern world, but also
offers the ability to produce the large number of standards that will be necessary
to speed future technological development. 28 However, there is a fly in the
ointment: Substantial risks to the effective operation of standard-setting
processes have developed from both an intellectual property and antitrust
perspective.
B. AT THE CONFLUENCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND ANTITRUST LAW

Recently, articles addressing standard-setting organizations and the issues
confronting them have abounded.2 9 That attention reflects the fact that standardsetting lies at the intersection of two powerful areas of the law: intellectual
property and antitrust. 3 There is a natural tension between these two areas of
law.3'

The creation and enforcement of intellectual property rights is a conceptual
contradiction. The Constitution authorizes3 2 and Congress has devised 33 a system
that values the creation of devices and processes and the communication of ideas
as a means to stimulate competition by rewarding that creativity with a grant of

2' Dawn C. Nunziato, Fireda, ofEp rsdion, Drmocrati.Norw, and Intenet Got'eance,52 EM )RY

L.J. 187 (2003); Phillip J. Weiser, InternetGovernance, StandardSettin&andSer-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L.
Riw. 822 (2001).
_9See infra Part IV.
30 Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualPropery Rights and Standard-Setting Oganizations, 90 CAl L. RE'.
1889 (2002); Michael J. Meurer, The Inteqfaa Between lnte/kctualProperty Law andAntitrust Law." Vertical
Restraints and IntellectualProperty Law: ByondAntitrust, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1871 (2003). The Lemley
article is an invaluable resource in the study of standard-setting organizations.
il See Balto & Wolman, supra note 25 (listing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of
intellectual property rights).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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legal monopolies.
Monopolies,
however, are commonly recognized as
34
economically anticompetitive.
The grant of a patent is the grant of a right on the part of the patentee to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale or selling the patented
Some defendants in patent infringement suits have asserted
invention. 3
violations of antitrust law as a defense where the patentee has refused to license
its patents or copyrights. 36 Antitrust authorities believe that the current state of
patent law may be worthy of additional antitrust scrutiny. 3' Thus, owners of
patents implicated in a standard are the beneficiaries of these rights, the value of
which is compounded by having been chosen for the standard.
On the other hand, monopolies resulting from market action also present a
conceptual contradiction. In a competitive world, the monopoly occurs by
attaining market efficiencies, satisfying customers, presenting a convenience, or
just being the best product or service on the market.3" The monopoly represents
the attainment of the ultimate position possible in a free market. All of the less
efficient competitors have been vanquished from the marketplace.
It is then that a monopoly endangers the competitive market that spawned it.
No longer having competitors to stoke the flames of competition, the monopoly
will become slothful.39 It may become jealous of potential rivals, using its

Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 401 ("Monopoly power is defined as: 'the power to control
prices or exclude competition.' ") (quoting United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.").
36The courts have generally found no violation for a patent owner's mere refusal to license on
its own terms to whomever it wishes. See, e.g., CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 53

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

31 See Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 473-74. The authors list four concerns expressed by
then FTC Chairman Timothy Muris before the American Bar Association Section Fall Forum.
Those four concerns are: (1) the increase in the number of patents, (2) the increased length of patent
term, (3) the increase in scope of patents, and (4) the role of Federal Circuit in "evolving intellectual
property jurisprudence." See also Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward. The FederalTrade Commissionand
the Future Development of U.S. Competition Pof'y, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359 (2003).
3' Burk & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1603 ("Kitch's prospect theory strongly emphasizes the role
of a single patentee coordinating the development, implementation, and improvement of an
invention."). Compare Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 398 (commenting on "deadweight loss"
resulting from monopolies), with United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430, 65
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 6, 18 (2d Cir. 1945) ("A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry.... The successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.").
" Burk & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1604 ("Ken Arrow has argued that competition, not
monopoly, best spurs innovation because, to simplify greatly, companies in a competitive
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domination of the marketplace to manipulate pricing or to deny others entry into
the marketplace. This conduct would rob the consumer of the benefits of the
free market.4"
Enter antitrust law. The common law recognized the dire effects of
anticompetitive conduct before the enactment of the Sherman Act and
subsequent antitrust statutes." Congress has empowered the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to protect the consumer from
anticompetitive conduct.4 2 A recent chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
has identified standard-setting and intellectual property as "an area in which the
agency is devoting substantial resources to identify enforcement targets-the
nexus between intellectual property ...and antitrust."43

marketplace will innovate in order to avoid losing, while monopolists can afford to be lazy.").
4" Id at 1601-02. Fundamental to this conclusion are three assumptions. First, Kitch postulates
that "a patent 'prospect' increases the efficiency with which investment in innovation can be
managed ....Mechnological information is a resource which will not be efficiently used absent
" Id Second, Kitch assumes that no one is likely to make significant
exclusive ownership ....
investments searching for ways to increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made
previous arrangements with the owner of the patent. Id This puts the patent owner in a position
to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value so that
duplicative investments are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.
Burk and Lemley go on to conclude that competition is necessary to extract Kitch's benefits of
monopoly. See id This debate mirrors the debate of incentives relevant to standard-setting.
41 See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873) (discussing
public policy objections to constraint of trade); Alger v. Thatcher, 36 Mass. 51, 54 (1837); see generally
PHILIP i. ARuIImnA & Hi.itRtr HOVENKAMP, ANTITRusi LAw, AN ANAIYSIS Oi ANTITRUSI
PRIN(:I P1ES AND THI?.IR AP'J.ICI'I)N 104 (2000).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), which states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $ 350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Section 2 subjects "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations" to the same liability. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
The source of the FTC's authority is 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (2000). At section 45(a)(2) the
Commission is directed to prevent the use of "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
" Mutis, supra note 37, at 390. Alternatively, Congress has acted to protect the formation of
joint ventures for the purpose of carrying on research and development. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000).
The Department of Justice and the FTC have produced guidelines to aid firms in licensing
I
l
I 1- , N I
intellectual property and collaborating. U.S. Di."" lo:J Ub '2& FTC, ANITRU GUI I IMP
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Thus, tension exists between intellectual property rights and anticompetitive
conduct. 4 The operation of standard-setting organizations represents a collision
of these two powerful forces. The law has yet to produce a clear path for
resolution of this tension. This uncertainty and the substantial economic stakes
have focused attention on and have stimulated the study of private standardsetting.
III.

THE PROBLEM

A. THE THREAT TO STANDARD-SETTING

The uncertainties attendant to the current model for private standard-setting
threaten its effectiveness. Given the litigation that has arisen from involvement
in standard-setting processes, attorneys for companies with large IP holdings may
have second thoughts about advising their clients to continue to participate, either
as an owner of IP or a potential licensee of a resulting standard.4" The basis for
that concern is that their clients, whether patent owners or licensees, may be
subject to protracted litigation in the courts or before the Federal Trade
46
Commission.

Today, the owner of IP rights implicated in an adopted standard is at risk of
losing the ability to enforce its statutory rights. Also, the participant-user of the
standard may have invested in complying with the adopted standard in reliance
on the conditions of participation, principally the duty of participants to disclose
related patents, only to find that the IP owner has not fully disclosed and has sued
the participant for infringement for practicing the standard. The SSO is
confronted with the options of making the conditions of participation ironclad
to protect the participant-licensees, while risking the loss of participation of IP

THE LICF NSING OF INT1 JE('UAI. PROPERFY (1995), availab at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/
04/intellec.htm; U.S. DEP'r OIEJUs'I(ICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GuIDIu.1NItS )R COI J.ABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), availabk at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/ 04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.

" See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,1576,14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at
first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both
are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.").
45 Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. LaVelle, Patents Coveing Industry Standards: The Risks to
Enforceabifiy Due to Condct Before Standard-SettingOrganiations,30 AIPLA Q.J. 95 (2002). The list of
relevant questions about SSO disclosure requirements is located at 101. The Cowie and LaVelle
article is a particularly valuable work.
4" See discussion infra of infringement litigation brought by Unocal and Rambus and actions
brought by the FTC against Dell, Unocal, and Rambus.
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that may contribute to the
owners, or relying on good faith compliance
47
security.
of
sense
false
participant-licensee's
The current disclosure and licensing policies of the American National
Standards Institution (ANSI) and the joint Electron Device Engineering Council
(JEDEC) reflect many of the issues associated with SSO participation.48 The

47Curran, supra note 22, at 992:
Patent owners need only promise to supply "fair," "reasonable,"
,nondiscriminatory' licenses to SSO members; beyond that requirement, SSO
patent policies offer no guidance as to what specific license terms should look
like, nor do they include penalty provisions for non-compliance. SSOs leave this
language intentionally vague in order to avoid liability for price fixing.
Id. See also Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 102 ("SSOs have been reluctant to specify or become
involved in setting royalty rates for patented technology for fear that they will be accused of price
fixing or another violation of antitrust laws."). Moreover, Gray states:
Typically, patent policies require that members disclose, prior to any vote on a
standard, the existence of any intellectual property or pending patent applications
that may relate to a standard under consideration. Advance notice of asserted
patent rights allows for infringement and licensing issues to be dealt with during
the standard-setting process, through either development of the standard around
existing patent rights or through negotiation of licenses with the patent holder
simultaneously to the promulgation of the standard.
Jennifer L. Gray, InternetStandardSetting Bodies: Antitrust Guidelines,in PLI's 21 ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON COMPUTER LAw at 515, 530 (PLI Patent, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Handbook Series No. 637, Feb.-Mar. 2001).
" For example, the American National Standard Institute (ANSI) patent policy allows standards
to be developed around a patented technology. See infra Part V (discussing the duty to disclose).
What follows is a selected portion of ANSI's Patent Policy:
3.1 ANSI patent policy-Inclusion of Patents in American National Standards
There is no objection in principle to drafting a proposed American National
Standard in terms that include the use of a patented item, if it is considered that
technical reasons justify this approach.
If the Institute receives a notice that a proposed American National Standard
may require the use of a patented invention, the procedures in this clause shall
be followed.
3.1.1 Statement from patent holder-Prior to approval of such a proposed
American National Standard, the Institute shall receive from the identified party
or patent holder (in a form approved by the Institute) either: assurance in the
form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does
not currently intend holding any invention the use of which would be required
for compliance with the proposed American National Standard or assurance that:
a) a license will be made available without compensation to the applicants
desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of implementing the standard;
or
b) a license will be made available to applicants under reasonable terms and
conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.
3.1.2 Record of statement
A record of the patent holder's statement shall be placed and retained in the
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ANSI policy expresses an expectation that participants hold no patent, "the use

files of the Institute.
3.1.3 Notice
When the Institute receives from a patent holder the assurance set forth in a)
or b) above, the standard shall include a note as follows:
NOTE: The user's attention is called to the possibility that compliance with this
standard may require use of an invention covered by patent rights.
By publication of this standard, no position is taken with respect to the
validity of this claim or of any patent rights in connection therewith. The patent
holder has, however, filed a statement of willingness to grant a license under
these rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to
applicants desiring to obtain such a license. Details may be obtained from the
standards developer.
3.1.4 Responsibility for identifying patents
The Institute shall not be responsible for identifying all patents for which a
license may be required by an American National Standard or for conducting
inquiries into the legal validity or scope of those patents that are brought to its
attention.
AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE ANSI PATENT POLICY
(1997), available at http://public.ansi.org/ansionline/Documents/.
To the same effect, consider Joint Electron Device Engineering Council's (JEDEC) Patent
Policy, dated June 20, 2003:
All participants inJEDEC formulating committees are expected to familiarize
themselves with the Patent Policy and comply with it. Among other things, the
Patent Policy requires the early disclosure of known patents and patent
applications that are or may be relevant to the work of the formulating
committee. This duty extends to the patent owner and any other participant on
the formulating committee with knowledge of the patent or patent application.
Questions of patent policy interpretations should be addressed to the JEDEC
legal department. (See Federal Trade Commission v. Dell Computer Corp., FTC
File 9310097.)
Failure to disclose relevant patents or pending patents could result in the loss
of those patent rights.
JOINT ELECTRON DEVICE ENG'G COUNCIL, JEDEC PATENT POLICY (2003) (citations omitted),
available at http://www.JEDEC.org/Home/manuals/EDEC-Patent__Poicy- stmt.pdf.
The policy is manifested by section 5.1, which requires ballots to contain a notice that "[i]f
anyone receiving this ballot is aware of any patents (granted or pending) involving [sic] in this ballot,
check here and notify the committee, citing the applicable patent numbers."
JOINT ELECTRON DEVICE ENGINEERING COUNCIL,JEDEC MANUAL OF ORGANIZATION
AND PROCEDURE (2003), availableat http://www.JEDEC.org/Home/manuals/JM21 L.pdf.

Other conditions are discussed at sections 8.2 and 8.3 and Appendices A and B. Section 8.2
provides, among other things:
If the committee indicates that the standard requires the use of patented items,
then the committee chairperson must receive a written assurance from the
organization holding rights to such patents that a license will be made available
to applicants desiring to implement the standard either without compensation or
under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstratably free of any unfair
discrimination.
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of which would be required for compliance with the proposed.., standard" or
that the participant-patent owner would commit licensing on a royalty-free basis
or under reasonable terms and conditions (RAND). ANSI assumes no obligation
to search for relevant patents and leaves the licensing to the participant-patent
owner and other participants. 9 ANSI's policy does not expressly encompass
patent applications and does not discuss a remedy for a participant's failure to
comply.
JEDEC's disclosure policy covers patents and patent applications "that are or
may be relevant to the work of the formulating committee.""0 The duty extends
"to the patent owner and any other participant on the formulating committee" or,
pursuant to article 5.1, to "anyone receiving this ballot."1 The JEDEC policy
passively anticipates that a disclosing participant-patent owner or applicant would
commit to licensing the other participants also on a royalty-free basis or under
reasonable terms and conditions.5 2 TheJEDEC policy makes no commitment of
confidentiality in the disclosure of patent applications. 53 Disclosure informs the
SSO and other participants that the disclosing party has an interest and that its
views may be self-centered and not directed toward arriving at the most effective
standard. Disclosure also may enable the participants to avoid adopting one
participant's patented technology as the standard. SSOs impose a duty to disclose
to protect the standard-setting process from antitrust liability. 4 As demonstrated
by the ANSI and JEDEC policies, the duty to disclose is often joined with a duty
to license under preset conditions, principally royalty-free licensing or licensing
under reasonable terms and conditions.55
Prior to adoption of the standard, a patentee whose patent is ultimately
adopted competes in the marketplace against competitors, realizing success
because of advantages of price, performance, availability, or other factors that
underlie the purchasing decisions of customers in that market. That value has
become recognized in legal scholarship as ex ante valuation; that is, the
technology's valuation prior to its adoption as the standard.56
If a standard-setting process adopts a standard that implicates a patentee's
technology, the patentee in most, if not all, situations becomes the controlling

4'

AM. NAT'I. STANDARDS INST., supra note 48, 3.1.4.
El .F.CHON Divici, ENG'G COUNCIIJEDEC PxTENr Poi ,iCY,spra note 48.

JOINT
51 id
"

52 Id
53 I

" See Curran, supra note 22; Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45.
'5 See AM. Nxi', SlANDARDS INST.,supra note 48;JOIN'i Ei.FUCIRt)N DiwtIi,.ENG ',COUNCI.,
JEDEC PATENT POLICY, supra note 48.
5' David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting andAntitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913
(2003).
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force in that technology market. Based upon that acquired status, the participantpatentee benefits from inflation of its technology's value; that is, expostvaluation
or the increased value of the technology associated with the adoption of the
patent as a standard. 7 Some see this inflation as a windfall."s Others believe that
the selection demonstrates the inherent value of the technology and entitles the
owner to the fruits of its labor.5 9
All the while, from the participant-patent owner's perspective, the specter of
antitrust enforcement hangs over its participation, holding the potential to deny
the patent owner the right to enforce its interest in the patent.
There is a market for participation in SSO standard-setting activities. Diverse
participation is important for a SSO's standard-setting process to arrive at the best
standard. Membership and participation in SSOs are voluntary. By choosing to
participate in the deliberations of the SSO, a firm may advocate the interests of
its customers and of its own technology. Should it choose not to participate in
setting a standard important to its business, a firm gives up the opportunity to
voice views that serve its business interests or its participation in identifying the
most effective standard.
As exemplified by the ANSI and JEDEC policies, SSOs rely on informal
means to gain compliance with the conditions of participation rather than using
enforceable means, such as a contract with the participants.6" A system of
enforcement would assure that breach of the conditions of participation would
result in some form of damages.
SSOs are likely reluctant to create a system of enforcement lest participation
among technology firms wane. When the risks of participation grow too large or
the benefits of participation diminish sufficiently, firms may choose not to
participate, reducing the effectiveness of private standard-setting. Under the
current unstable state of the law, there are sufficient legal risks to warrant a
potential participant to carefully weigh the risks and benefits of participation.61

Id at 1938.
s See Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust and the Costs of Standard-Setting: A Commentary on Teece and
Sherry, 87 MINN. L. RiV. 1995 (2003).
s9 James C. DeVellis, PatentingIndustry Standards: Balancingthe Rghts of PatentHoderswith the Need
for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 301, 350 (2003) ("RAND licensing best provides
corporations with the necessary initial incentive to develop technology, while maximizing the
availability of that technology in any subsequent standard.").
"' Lemley, supra note 30, at 1954-57 (finding that SSO intellectual property rules are "a 'messy'
form of private ordering").
' Judge Rader wrote in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 n.10, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1720 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2003): "Just as lack of compliance with a well-defined
patent policy would chill participation in open standard-setting bodies, after-the-fact morphing of
a vague, loosely defined policy to capture actions not within the actual scope of that policy likewise
would chill participation in open standard-setting bodies."
17
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The current policies of ANSI and JEDEC reflect a dependence on a duty to
disclose. 62 However, the expression of the duty to disclose is vague. At the same
time, they reflect an absence of an express enforcement system. As a result, these
SSOs must rely only upon the good faith compliance of the participants. The
current model imposes large risks on the participant-patent owner and the other
participants. The following scenarios provide insight into the issues that threaten
private standard-setting.
B. THREE SCENARIOS

1. Company A Is a Member of an SSO in the Field of Electronic Games. It
participates during deliberations over several months directed at establishing a
standard for video graphics. The standard-setting organization requires and orally
reminds its participants that they have a duty to disclose "patents that relate to the
standard" at the time the committee votes on the standard. The SSO has a policy
that it will not adopt a standard that is owned by one firm.
CompanyA is represented by an engineer who has no knowledge of Company
A's patent and reads on the standard signing the ballot accordingly. Subsequently,
Company A informs the SSO and its co-participants that it has a patent that is
implicated in the standard and that it intends to pursue its rights to maximize its
royalty income from that patent, and it does, in fact, bring suit against Company
B, one of its co-participants, alleging infringement by Company B's practice of the
standard.
2. Company A Partidpatesin a Standard-Settingb a State EnvironmentalAgengyfor
a FuelFormulato Reduce Emissions. The agency imposes no duty to disclose. There
is a question as to whether the rulemaking is quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in
nature. Company A has applied for a patent on a fuel formula for the same
purposes, but does not disclose it to the agency or other participants, including
competitors.
Company A advocates a standard that is broader than its formula, but the
agency adopts the narrower standard that implicates Company A's formula.
Company B participated in the standard-setting process and makes a substantial
investment in preparation for producing gasoline that complies with the standard.
Company A's patent issues, and it sues Company B for infringement.
3. Company A Designs Computer Chips. It arrives at an advanced design and
applies for a patent. It joins an SSO that is developing a standard for computer
chips. Company A participates, and its representatives bring information back

62

See AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., supra note 48,1 31.1; JOINT ELECTRON DEVICE ENG'G

COUNCIL,JEDEC PATENT POLICY,spra note 48, % 5.1, 8.2.
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to Company A about the designs under consideration. The company amends its
application and divisional applications to cover the evolving standard.
The SSO communicates a duty to disclose IP interests in pending standards.
Early in the process, Company A informs the participants of the written
description of the pending application. Before votes on the pending standard are
taken, Company A resigns from the SSO. The deliberations continue and a
standard that implicates Company A's patents-all of them divisional from the
original application and several having issued-is adopted. Company B
participated in the standard-setting and begins to manufacture chips that comply
with the standard. Company A sues Company B for infringement of its patents.
For each scenario, what advice should (1) Company A's General Counsel, (2)
Company B's General Counsel, or (3) the SSO's (or agency's) General Counsel
each give to her client?
C. IP TOOLS

In these and other similar cases, the courts have struggled to decide whether
the conduct of the patent owner has provided a legal basis for denying the
infringement liability. Defendants have offered a medley of legal theories. The
theories range from patent misuse to antitrust and from fraud to laches. The
courts have shown a willingness to listen and in many cases have jury-rigged a
remedy to fit the facts, but no single path or legal theory has emerged.63
1. Patent Misuse. Assertion of patent misuse in standard-setting does not
conform to the classic circumstance in which it is offered by an alleged
contributory infringer as a defense when the patent owner has attempted to
extend the breadth of its patent by tying its license to unpatented goods. 64 Courts
would then have to adapt this doctrine to conform to the standard-setting
situation. In standard-setting, the participant-patentee is not attempting to assert
its patent against non-infringing items, but is asserting a patent not disclosed
during the standard-setting deliberations.
Adaptation of the patent misuse doctrine to standard-setting would overcome
a major criticism: The defendant-contributory infringer defeats his liability not

63

See Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45 (discussing various causes of action).

'4

CompareJaniceM. Mueller, PatentMisuse Through the CaptureofIndustry Standards,17 BERKELEY

TECH. L.J. 623, 630 (2002) (advocating the use of the patent misuse doctrine in certain standardsetting situations), with Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrational'yof the PatentMisuse Doctrine, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 1599 (1990). See also Morgan Chu etal., PatentMisuseDefenses andAntitrust,17 PLI's SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw at 831 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 721, Oct.-Nov. 2002) (discussing a
narrowing of the gap between assertion of patent misuse and antitrust law); seegeneral Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
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by the plaintiff-patentee's illegal acts toward the defendant, but by the plaintiffpatentee's acts toward the alleged actual infringer, who is not a party to the
litigation. In other words, in its classic application, the plaintiff-patentee has not
wronged the defendant, but the defendant is relieved of liability because of the
plaintiff's acts toward the actual infringer.65
The successful assertion of patent misuse in a standard-setting patent
infringement suit also provides its advocates with their intended result, that is, an
inability of the patentee-plaintiff to enforce its patent against a participant when
the patentee failed to disclose the existence of its patent during the standardsetting process.66 As will be seen, this remedy is also the same as is currently
sought by the Federal Trade Commission in actions brought based upon
anticompetitive harm.67
2. Laches. Laches is an equitable doctrine. Normally, infringer-defendants
offer this defense when (1) the patentee has actual or constructive knowledge of
the alleged infringement, (2) the patentee delays pursuit of enforcement of the
infringement for an unreasonable time, and (3) the delay prejudices the infringer."

'5 Congress reacted to the intersection of the theories of patent misuse and contributory
infringement by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) and (d) (2000), which state:
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of
the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without
his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought
to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement;
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.
See Mueller, supra note 64, at 673.
S
17 Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 420; see also infra Part III.D.
"' A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed.
Cit. 1992); Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 113.
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The successful assertion of this defense does not prevent the patent owner
from enforcing its patent. The doctrine merely prevents the patent owner from
recovering damages occurring before the institution of the suit.69 Therefore,
laches does not provide a neat remedy when the patentee-plaintiff has not
disclosed its patent in a standard-setting environment."v The alleged infringer
could only assert this defense when the non-disclosing-patentee has not brought
its infringement suit within a reasonable time. 1
3. Estoppel. The courts have also used the equitable estoppel doctrine in
standard-setting infringement cases. Alleged infringers offer this defense in
instances in which (1) the patentee misleads the alleged infringer, (2) the alleged
infringer relies on the misleading conduct, and (3) the alleged infringer would
suffer material prejudice.72
When estoppel is found, the patentee is denied enforcement of its patent.
Where the disclosure requirement and its boundaries are clearly communicated,
estoppel appears to suit the standard-setting process better than a laches theory.
A court has found estoppel where the patentee participated in a standard-setting
process, left before a standard was adopted, and did not notify the SSO of its
patent's implication in the standard.7 ' The court classified that the patentee's
silence and failure to disclose was intentionally misleading conduct.74 The court
did not discuss whether the SSO actually had a policy requiring disclosure.75
The courts have found an implied license on facts similar to those that would
give rise to estoppel. 76 The Federal Circuit has distinguished an implied license

69 Cowie & LaVelle,

supra note 45, at 114.

7 Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709, 1715 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (fashioning a
remedy based upon the patentee's delay in asserting his patent after the standard was adopted).
71 Notwithstanding the prompt action by Unocal, the FTC complaint alleged that the affected
gasoline producers made very large investments. This suggests that were this doctrine to be
modified to fit the standard-setting scenario, the reliance period would begin during the deliberations
and not the issuance of the patent. See Complaint of the FTC, In rs Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305
(F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), availabk at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm; Answer of
Union Oil Co, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 21, 2003), availabk at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index. htm.
'2 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042-3; Stambkr, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1711; see Cowie & LaVelle, supranote
45, at 104 (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and subsequent cases in which the court based
estoppel on the patentee's failure to disclose).
71 Stambler,at 1718.
14 Id at 960-1042.
75 Id; see also Aukerman at 1043-44 ("Moreover, silence alone will not create an estoppel unless
there was a clear duty to speak, [citation omitted] or somehow the patentee's continued silence
reinforces the defendant's inference from the plaintiff's known acquiescence that the defendant will
be unmolested.").
76 Wang Labs., 103 F.3d at 1580 (citing DeForest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236,
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from an estoppel in that the implied license "looks for an affirmative grant of
consent or permission to make, use, or sell" while equitable estoppel "focuses on
77
misleading conduct suggesting that the patentee will not enforce patent rights.
4. Fraud. Recently, in cases such as Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 8
the defendant in the infringement suit arising out of an alleged breach of a duty
to disclose has counterclaimed for common law fraud. Rambus shows that juries
may be receptive to such a counterclaim allegation.7 9 The jury's verdict and
district court's judgment in Rambus, however, were overturned on appeal. 8'
Assertion of fraud as a remedy for breach of the duty to disclose poses a
weakness in that, because it is a remedy of state law, its assertion would be
inconsistent and its value less predictable. Patent owners may forum shop to
minimize the opportunity for the defendant to successfully allege fraud. To this
point, fraud has only been asserted as a counterclaim.81 As discussed later, I
believe that it is not possible to describe the duty to disclose sufficiently for
purposes of establishing fraud.82
Scenario 3, supra,was a rough restatement of the facts in Rambus, arguably a
blatant example of manipulation of participation in a standard-setting process.
Rambus, the patent owner, sued Infmeon, the participant and alleged infringer,
in Federal District Court for infringement of fifty-seven claims on four of its

241 (1927)), states:
Any language used by the owner of the patent, or any conduct on his part
exhibited to another from which that other may properly infer that the owner
consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which
the other acts, constitutes a license and a defense to an action for a tort.
77Id.at 1581.
78 155 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter Rambus ] (accounting for costs and fees),
164 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va. 2001) [hereinafter Rambbus II] (denying plaintiff's motion forJMOL),

rrv'd318F.3d 1081,65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Rambus IIl (The Federal
Circuit: 1) vacated the JMOL of non-infringement; 2) reversed the JMOL on the SDRAM verdict;
3) affirmed the grant of JMOL "because the district court properly determined that substantial
evidence did not support the jury finding that Rambus had a duty to disclose patents and
applications before formal consideration of a standard"; and 4) vacated and remanded the award of
attorney's fees).
" Rambus I, 155 F. Supp. at 671 ("The jury awarded nominal damages in the amount of $1 on
each of the fraud claims (Count 10-actual fraud; Count 11-constructive fraud) and punitive damages
in the amount of $3,500,000.00 on the actual fraud claim."). The court reduced the damages to

$350,000.
80RambuslII, 318 F.3d at 1106-07.
" Query: Could a potential defendant, aware of a patent owner-participant's failure to disclose,
bring this action offensively, not waiting for the patent owner to sue? In Rambus there were no
actual damages. The jury's award as remitted by the court were punitive damages and attorney fees.
82This Article argues that another model is needed and that reliance on the duty to disclose is
futile. See infra Part V.
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patents.83 Infmeon answered with a host of defenses,84 but this discussion
considers only the counterclaims for actual and constructive fraud.85
In April 1990, Rambus filed a patent application relating to RDRAM, an
advanced form of random access memory. 6 Subsequently, the application was
segregated into ten divisional applications, each claiming the original priority date
and each containing the original written description. 7
In December 1991, Rambus sat in on a meeting of the Joint Electron Devices
Engineering Council (JEDEC) as a guest.88 More recently, this organization is
referenced as the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, 89 and itisa
standard-setting organization. In February of 1992, Rambus joined JEDEC. 90
JEDEC's manual stated its disclosure policy which included an obligation to
disclose patents and patent applications. 91 The manual also required that the:
"chairperson... must... call to the obligation of all participants to inform the
meeting of any knowledge they may have of any patents,
or pending patents, that
92
might be involved in the work they are undertaking.
83 Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1086.

Infineon pled that (1) the four patents-in-suit were not infringed, were invalid and were
unenforceable; (2) Rambus had breached its contract with JEDEC; (3) Infineon was a third-party
beneficiary of that breached contract; (4) Rambus committed actual fraud while a member of
JEDEC; (5)Rambus committed constructive fraud while a member ofJEDEC; (6) Rambus obtained
monopoly power in the relevant technology market in violation of the Sherman Act; (7) Rambus had
attempted to obtain a monopoly in the relevant technology market in violation of the Sherman Act;
and (8) Rambus violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1961-1968 (2000), by conduct at JEDEC. Answer of Infmeon Tech. AG, Rambus 1, 155 F. Supp.
2d 668 (No. Civ. A. 3:00CV524).
85 Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1096. The elements of fraud under Virginia law require proof by clear
and convincing evidence of: "1) a false representation (or omission in the face of a duty to disclose),
2) of a material fact, 3) made intentionally and knowingly, 4) with the intent to mislead, 5) with
reasonable reliance by the misled party, and 6) resulting in damages to the misled party." Judge
Rader concluded that the duty to disclose under JEDEC's policy extended only to a patent that
would be infringed by the standard. Id. at 1100-01.
81

Id.at 1084.

87 Id.

88 Id.at 1085.
89 JEDEC operates through various designated committees, each formed to consider specific

types of standards. JEDEC's Committee JC-42.3 drafts standards for random access memory
(RAM), a common component in computers, printers, and other electronic devices. JEDEC
meetings are open meetings, but nonmembers must receive an invitation to attend. Minutes of the
JEDEC meetings and copies of the published JEDEC standards are available to members and
nonmembers alike.
9 Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1085.
91 Id.; see als0JOINT ELECTRON DEVICE ENG'G COUNCILJEDEC PATENT POLICY,

supra note

48 (concerning current JEDEC policies).
92 Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1110. Note here that the companies are not required to contractually
commit themselves to this duty. Further note that the duty, as expressed, implies that the duty is

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7

J.INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 12:163

The deliberations at issue were those of the JC-42.3 Subcommittee, which
developed a standard relating to synchronous dynamic random access memory
(SDRAM).93 Participants usually met on a quarterly basis. Before being
considered for adoption, the subcommittee discussed the proposal twice, and
voted on a proposed standard using written ballots. A two-thirds majority was
required, though a consensus was common. Once adopted, the subcommittee
forwarded the proposed standard to the Council.
Rambus disclosed a patent that issued in 1993 which shared the same written
description as the pending applications. 94 Another participant disclosed
information concerning a related Rambus application to the World International
Property Organization (WIPO).9' Rambus' business plans revealed that the
company was carrying out a scheme to amend its applications to cover the
standard. 96 JEDEC adopted its SDRAM standard in November of 1993 with the
result that, by 1999,JEDEC compliant SDRAM had effectively replaced DRAM
technology.
Rambus ceased participating in theJC-42.3 committee in December 1995 and
formally withdrew from JEDEC in June 1996.97 After Rambus's resignation,
JEDEC began formal consideration of a standard for double data rate-SDRAM
(DDR-SDRAM), the successor to SDRAM. Prior to Rambus's withdrawal,
JEDEC had discussed four technologies, that is, source-synchronous clocking,
low-voltage swing signaling, dual clock edge, and on-chip phase locked loop/delay
locked loop (PLL/DLL). JEDEC later included those four technologies in its
DDR-SDRAM standard, which was published in 2000.9'

limited to the representative of the company, not the company itself. Additionally, note that the
scope of the duty is not informative, that it, "might be involved in the work they are undertaking."
And finally note that the duty to disclose extends patent applications and contains no reciprocal
guarantee of confidentiality.
" Id at 1085.
94

Id

95 Id.

" Normally, amending one's patent application to cover a competitor's product is legal and
expected conduct. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,909 n.2, 669 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1810 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that "[t]he district court recognized that it is not
improper for an applicant to broaden his claims during prosecution in order to encompass a
competitor's products, as long as the disclosure supports the broadened claims"); Kingsdown
Medical Consultants, Ltd v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Rambus'
representatives at the JC-42.3 meetings reported back to the company their observations about the
technical discussions. Rambus was accused of using the observations to amend the claims of its
pending applications to cover the evolving standard.
9' Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1085.
98 Id at 1105.
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Three counts went to the jury: actual fraud, constructive fraud and a violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).99 The jury
found for Rambus on the RICO count." However, it found Rambus liable for
actual and constructive fraud.1"' It awarded nominal actual damages but $3.5
million in punitive damages. 2 The district court then granted Rambus' motion
for judgment as a matter of law as to the constructive fraud count, holding that
constructive fraud under Virginia law may not occur for omission. 03 The district
court denied the motion as to actual fraud and reduced the punitive damage award
to $350,000.1' In a separate decision, the court awarded Infineon attorney fees
of over $7 million. 5
Appeal was then taken to the Federal Circuit. Judge Rader's decision for
the majority provides a primer of the difficulties that accompany the duty to
disclose. He reviewed the claim construction, and concluded that the JEDEC
duty to disclose was more illusory than real and enforceable. 106 This Article
discusses the portion of the Federal Circuit's decision relating to the duty to
disclose in Part V.
The case is now back before the district court, with all the counts in the
complaint reinstated. The district court has granted Infmeon's motion to add a
count covering unfair business practices under California law."7
In a related case, Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.,05 Micron raised claims
similar to those Infmeon asserted. It alleged fraud by its failure to disclose to
JEDEC monopolization and fraud.0 9 Micron attempted to use the fraud verdict
in the Infmeon case through collateral estoppel."' The district court held
Micron's motion for summary judgment on infringement in abeyance but denied
its motion as to all the other claims, including the assertion of collateral estoppel,

9' 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
RambusI, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Rambus II, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
'K

Id at 747.
Rambus 1, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
106 Rambus III, 318 F.3d at 1102 ("A policy that does not define clearly what, when, how, and to
whom the members must disclose does not provide a firm basis for the disclosure duty necessary
for a fraud verdict.").
107 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2002); see Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 304
F.
Supp. 2d 812 (E. D. Va. 2004). The FTC brought a complaint against Rambus, which I discuss in
Part III.D, infra.
108 189 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D. Del. 2002).
"9 Id. at 202-03.
10 Id. at 203-04.
"

i"'
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and noted that the Infineon trial did not establish that Micron had relied to its
detriment on Rambus' alleged duty to disclose."'
5. InequitableConduct. Successful pleading of inequitable conduct would render
the patent unenforceable." 2 In Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.," 3 the court
entered a decision denying a defense based upon Unocal's alleged inequitable
conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office in not disclosing the patent's
relationship to the California Air Resources Board's (CARB) standard-setting." 4
On appeal, the State of California made a novel use of this argument when it
asserted that Unocal's breach of a duty to disclose in CARB's standard-setting
process and Unocal's amendment of its patent application to cover the standard
were instances of inequitable conduct." 5
6. PrivateAntitrustActions. Defendants in an infringement suit have sought a
remedy for restraint of trade in a plaintiff's failure to disclose in a standard-setting
process." 6 The remedy is significant when an antitrust violation is found, and
includes treble damages and attorney fees." 7 Historically, the courts have found
antitrust violations in standard-setting situations when a conspiracy was present."8
Infmeon's countersuit against Rambus included a count for monopolization
arising from Rambus' participation in JEDEC."9 Research has disclosed no
decisions in which a defense of restraint of trade has been successfully pled in a
private standard-setting case for a patent owner's failure to disclose. Assertion of
an antitrust violation predicated upon a duty to disclose should seriously consider
the accuracy with which the duty to disclose was communicated.

n Id at 213.
12 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
113 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
114 Id
M1 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of California in Support of Defendants-Appellants'
Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208
F.3d 989, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-1066). Success of the State's theory
would have elevated a duty to disclose in a standard-setting environment to an equitable duty having
nothing to do with the patent application. The Federal Circuit denied the petition. The defendant's
counterclaim did not raise inequitable conduct as a defense on the failure to disclose during the
CARB rulemaking. The counterclaim alleged inequitable conduct in Unocal's prosecution of its
patent applications for gasoline mixtures that Unocal had previously produced but not disclosed to
the PTO. The district court awarded attorney fees to Unocal, attributing its decision in part to
unsupported allegations of estoppel, implied license, unclean hands, and inequitable conduct.
116 Rambus II, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
,,' 15 U.S.C. %§1, 2 (2000).
116 See Balto, supra note 23, at 5-6.
19 Rambges II, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 746; see alro Mir Tech., Itnc., 189 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
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This cause of action has been asserted where a governmental body has been
the standard setter.'2 1 In the governmental standard-setting context, freedom of
expression issues arise. The courts have resolved that apparent conflict-the
right to advocate a position before a governmental body-by defining a defense
his
known as the Noerr-Penningtonimmunity,'2" giving a person the right to petition
22
anticompetitive1
be
might
that
result
a
of
pursuit
in
even
government,
D. ANTITRUST TOOLS

In addition to the assertion of antitrust by a private party as discussed above,
an intricate statutory regime vests the Department of Justice and the Federal
Thus far, the Justice
Trade Commission with enforcement powers.123
Department has not intervened in private standard-setting, relating to the attempt
to control the market by not disclosing related patents. The FTC, however, has
brought actions against Dell, Unocal, and Rambus. The theory upon which it
brings such actions is evolving. This section provides an overview of the FTC's
causes of action and remedies in instances in which it asserts anticompetitive
conduct in a patent owner's failure to disclose in a standard-setting process.
1. ShermanAct 24 Section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes a private cause of
action for attempted monopolization consisting of (1) the specific intent to
destroy competition, (2) anticompetitive conduct, (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power, and (4) antitrust injury. 12 1 Section 2 also proscribes
actual monopolization. The elements are (1) the accused party having a
monopoly, (2) having engaged in anticompetitive conduct, and (3) having caused
126
antitrust injury.
The Department ofJustice and the Federal Trade Commission have joined to
provide guidelines under which they analyze licensing practices and competitor

12,

E. RR Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1966).

1_Id; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). However, where the

standard-setting is private, not governmental, the immunity does not apply. Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
122 Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,513
U.S. 813 (1994) ("Because the injuries Sessions complains of are the result of governmental action,
Joor is shielded by petitioning immunity from liability under the antitrust laws.").
12 15 U.S.C. 1§ 1, 2, 45 (2000).
124 15 U.S.C.
1-7 (2000).
125 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); Balto & Wolman, supra note
25, at 397; Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 118.
126 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Balto & Wolman, supra note 25,
at 397; Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 119-20.
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collaborations, which are areas dominated by intellectual property rights. 27 In the
licensing guidelines, the agencies lay out three "general principles":
(1) that intellectual property rights are "essentially comparable to
any other form of property"; (2) that intellectual property rights do
not inherently create objectionable market power; and (3) that
the
12
licensing.
of
potential
procompetitive
the
recognize
agencies
Nevertheless, those agencies have identified certain licensing arrangements
that fix retail prices, allocate markets or customers, reduce output, or require
certain boycotts 29 as not only anticompetitive, but per se anticompetitive, which
is a classification not necessitating further analysis. 3 The agencies subject
arrangements-such as horizontal restraints, resale price maintenance, tying
arrangements, exclusive dealing, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements,
grantbacks, and 3 certain
transfers of intellectual property rights-to a rule of
1
reason analysis.'
2. Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC is aggressively exercising its
jurisdiction in standard-setting. It has initiated actions in Dell, Unocal,and Rambus
based upon the breach of an alleged duty to disclose in a standard-setting
process.' 32 Each of these actions indicates the FTC's willingness to act as a
surrogate for the respective SSO and other participants. The FTC's assumption
of the role as the forum of last resort hinders the standard-setting process by
allowing the current vague communication of the duty to disclose to engender

'27See

U.S. DiP'T oi Jus'cit
t

.

& FTC, AN'IIIrtusr GUIDl.INI

.

F()R
i'FIIHLICI.NSING OiF

IN'FlAI.I1U AI, PR(O I' IY, supra note 43.
12,Id.; see also U.S. D"IiP'T ()JUSTICiE & FTC, ANTrI'RusT GUII)PIINF.S FO)R CQ )IIABORATI()NS
AMONc CoMpPI''roRs, supra note 43 (sharing the same considerations).
12- U.S. DilPi' Oi JUSTICI , & FTC, ANTIHRUST GUImI).INIlS FO)R 'IHP LICIlNSING; iP
INTI' , I.(-UA, PROPIATY, supra note 43, at 15.

I Id. at 15 (citing FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (addressing
an agreement among attorneys to refuse to compete for or accept appointments under the Criminal
Justice Act program until the District of Columbia increased the fees was per se illegal); Nat'l Soc'y
of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (stating that a society's canon of ethics
prohibiting the discussion of price with potential customer until after selection was per se illegal)).
'" U.S. Dj I 'T op JUS'II(rIci
& FTC, ANTI'RUS. GUIDIEIINF-S FOR THE LIcENSING 01;
IN'Fli ,I.1IUAI PROPFAR'Y, supra note 43, at 23-30. The guidelines also describe a "safety zone" to
provide certainty and encourage innovation and enhanced competition: "[T]he Agencies will not
challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially
anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty
percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint." Id at 22.
132 In re Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996); In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9305/index.htm; In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302
(F.T.C. Feb. 23,2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9302/index.htm.
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potential liability. The cases have been brought against patent owners whose
patent was likely the best solution to the technological issue resolved by the
respective standard. The FTC approach would, therefore, remove the burden of
coming to grips with the duty to disclose from the SSO and the participants in the
standard-setting process, which are in the best situation to deal with the problem.
The FTC's choice to define a cause of action centered on the duty to disclose,
has shown that duty to be illusory and dangerous as currently administered. 3
Firms wishing to participate in a standard-setting process may believe that the
others are complying with their interpretation of the duty to disclose or that there
is an effective remedy. The participants may, based upon that faith, make
business decisions including substantial investments, only to find that their faith
was misplaced and that they are sued for infringement for practicing the standard.
By interceding, the FTC impedes the discovery of a standard-setting model
that will work; one that can describe the duty to disclose with sufficient exactitude
to be enforceable. On the other hand, I assert that this experimentation would
result in the discovery that clarity in the expression of enforceable conditions of
participation in standard-setting is not practical. The more precise the definition
of the duty to disclose, the less likely that patent owners would be willing to
accept the risks of participation in standard-setting. Interestingly, the FTC has
stated that an SSO need not require disclosure.134 This Article proposes a
workable alternative to the duty to disclose.
Each of these three cases involve technology that is likely the best solution to
the issue that the standard was intended to confront. The remedy the FTC
sought in each of these three cases and the one achieved in DeP3 s would deny the
patent owner the ability to enforce its patent rights. The three cases taken
together consider whether a patentee need actually enforce its patent rights to
subject itself to liability under an FTC action; whether the patent owner's activities
making test data that indicates its products' advantages available to a public body
is protected by freedom of speech; whether a misrepresentation can occur by
implication and where omission does not affect the accuracy of the data it did
supply; whether a duty to disclose can be implied, not dealing with whether a
participant has a right to attempt to design its patent application claims to cover

Complaint of the FTC, In re Union Oil of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm; Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, Rambus, Inc.
v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-37).
134See In ir Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C. at 626 ("Nor should this enforcement action contain a general
suggestion that standard-setting bodies should impose a duty to disclose."). Balto recognized that
a duty to disclose is not required in a standard-setting environment; however, he suggests that SSOs
use it as a "strong procompetitive signal." Balto, supra note 23, at 14. 1 discuss the inherent
ineffectiveness of the duty to disclose in Part V.A, infra.
135 Id
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the evolving standard; and whether a duty to disclose extends beyond the
resignation by the patent owner-participant, among other issues.
a. Dell The FTC brought a complaint against Dell Computer Corporation
based upon the company's participation in a 1992 standard-setting process under
36
VESA
the auspices of the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA).
develops standards for computer graphics, particularly for use in electronic
gaming. The standard being developed was for a "VESA Local Bus" or "VLBus"' 137 to meet the needs of video-intensive software. Buses are a common
connection point for multiple circuits intersecting within the same system.
38
According to the complaint, Dell had acquired the '481 patent, which gave Dell
"exclusive rights to the mechanical slot configuration used on the motherboard
' 39
to receive the VL-bus card.'
After arriving at a proposed standard, the VESA committee polled its
members, and on July 20, 1992, the Dell representative voted for the new
standard and represented that "to the best of his knowledge 'this proposal does not
infringe on any trademarks, copyrights, or patents' that Dell possessed."' 0 Later,
on August 6, the Dell representative again voted for the proposed standard and
renewed his representation that,41to the best of his knowledge, the standard would
not infringe his company's IP.1
Over the course of the next eight months, 1.4 million computers were sold
using the new standard. Dell then told the other VESA participants that use of
the recently adopted standard infringed Dell's '481 patent, and demanded that the
other members meet with Dell to determine how Dell's exclusive rights would be
recognized. 4 2 Dell did not sue for infringement.
The FTC complaint alleged that "Dell has unreasonably restrained
competition" by first hindering acceptance of the VL-bus design standard
"because some computer manufacturers delayed their use of the design standard
until the patent issue was clarified,"'' 43 and that "[s]ystems utilizing the VL-bus

In r DellCorp., 121 F.T.C. at 617, 4. Interestingly, the FTC approved a settlement with
another SSO where that SSO refused to adopt a standard to include an effective device because that
device was patented. See In reAm. Soc'y of Sanitary Eng'g, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1985).
'7 In reDellCotp., 121 F.T.C. at 617, 5 ("[T]he VL-bus [is] a mechanism to transfer instructions
between the computer's central processing unit and its peripherals.").
"3'U.S. Patent No. 5,036,481 (issued July 30, 1991).
131In reDellCorp., 121 F.T.C. at 618, 6.
Id. at 618, 7 (emphasis added).
,' The complaint does not allege that the representative had personal knowledge or that Dell

corporately was aware of the '481 patent to the VL-Bus standard. Id
142Id. at 618,
6. Dell did not actually bring suit. I question the FTC's acting before Dell's
intentions were clear.
141Id at 618, 9. The complaint does not describe Dell's actual anticompetitive conduct.
Apparently, Dell's mere assertion of its interests was sufficient to stifle the market. First, there is the
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss1/7
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design standard were avoided due to concerns that
patent issues would affect the
1' 44
VL-bus' success as an industry design standard."
The complaint also asserted that "[tihe uncertainty concerning the acceptance
of the VL-bus design standard raised the costs of implementing the VL-bus
design as well as the costs of developing competing bus designs"' 4 5 and that
"[w]ilhingness
to participate in industry standard-setting efforts have been
146
chilled."'

obvious question whether Dell's representative certified with knowledge of the Dell patent and
whether the relationship of the VL-bus standard and the '481 patent occurred subsequent to the final
formal adoption of the standard. Secondly, the complaint fails to identify any effort by Dell to sue
for infringement or even to negotiate licenses. The complaint recites Dell's only demand that the
parties meet to "determine... the manner in which Dell's exclusive rights will be recognized." Id
44 Id FTC Complaint Counsel wrote this count in a passive sentence structure. In so doing,
the Complaint Counsel avoided the necessity of establishing proof of the alleged market reaction to
Dell's allegedly inaccurate certification and its subsequent assertion of its intention not to allow use
without recognition of its rights. The second count did not provide the timing between Dell's
announcement of its rights and the market response. The theory of Del, Unocal,and Rambus fails
to consider the fact that standard-setting organizations can avoid such dilemmas by adopting a
replacement standard, perhaps leaving the patent owner, like Sony with its BetaMax, to ponder its
rights while the market adjusts.
14 Id Again, those effects are not asserted in the predicate to the complaint.
Id This alleged potential chilling effect would, under the complaint, result from Dell's failure
I'
to disclose in the presence of a duty to disclose. For an entirely different reason, the failure of an
SSO to clearly define the duty to disclose, Judge Rader expressed a similar concern in Rambus, as
quoted in note 61, supra. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d 1081. In the Dell complaint, however, there was no
predicate to associate Dell's rather benign conduct and the chilling effect on standard-setting in
general. In re Dell Corp., 127 F.T.C. 616.
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Notwithstanding a spirited dissent,'47 the FTC approved a consent order its
staff had negotiated with Dell. Under the order, Dell gave up its rights to assert
any right in the '481 patent for use of the VL-bus in the manufacture of computer
equipment over the entire remaining term of the patent. This agreement to cease
and desist from asserting its rights includes even "the threat, prosecution, or
defense of any suits or other actions, whether legal, equitable, or administrative,
as well as any arbitrations, mediations, or any other form of private dispute
4
resolution."' 1
Under the consent order, Dell further agreed for a period of ten years to
"cease and desist from enforcing or threatening to enforce any patent rights" if
the other party's use or sale is in implementation of an industry design standard
and in response to a written inquiry from a standard-setting organization, "[Dell]

147

In r Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (Azcuenaga, M., dissenting).

Commissioner Mary L.

Azcuenaga noted the ironic effect of the Dell consent order, asserting that the threat of losing one's
ability to enforce its IP rights, in fact, "may dissuade some firms from participating in the standardssetting process in the first place." Id at 633.
Her dissent states "[tihe sole act for which Dell is charged with a violation of law is that Dell's
voting representative, in voting to adopt the standard, signed a certification that to the best of his
knowledge, the proposed standard did not infringe on any relevant intellectual property." Id at 638.
Her position is that the complaint makes out a novel theory for prosecution under section 5 of the
FTC Act, not dependent upon a showing that "Dell intentionally and knowingly misled VESA and
without any allegation that Dell obtained market power beyond that lawfully conferred by the
patent" as a result of the misstatement at issue. Id at 629.
Commissioner Azcuenaga observed that "the Commission effectively imposes a duty of
disclosure on Dell beyond what VESA required." Id at 630. She noted that the statement signed
by the Dell representative could have been drafted in a way to have been very specific about his
certifying as to Dell's entire IP portfolio, but it did not. Id at 641. The order effectively assumes
that additional and very significant fact.
Even under the less rigorous standard used for common law fraud, clear and convincing
evidence is required to show "that the patent applicant failed to disclose material information known
to the applicant, or that the applicant submitted false information with the intent to act inequitably."
Id. at 631. The express wording of the VESA ballot was limited to knowledge of the individual
representative.
Commissioner Azcuenaga further noted that there are no allegations that Dell gained market
power. Id at 632. She found the remedy "unnecessarily harsh." Id at 633. She also found the
allegations of the complaint "highly ephemeral" and noted the private remedy of patent estoppel
"should suffice to remedy expectations based on Dell's conduct by barring inappropriate
enforcement of a patent claim." Id at 634. However, she noted in order to make out the case, the
party asserting the defense must prove "(1) a misleading communication by way of words, conduct
or silence by a knowledgeable patentee; (2) reliance by another party on the communication; and (3)
material prejudice to the other party if the patent holder is allowed to proceed." Id at 633. By its
action, the FTC removed the burden of proving material prejudice.
" Id at 620.
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intentionally failed to disclose such patents rights while [the standard] was under
149
consideration.,
The FTC sought its remedy even though Dell did nothing more than inform
the VESA participants of Dell's intention to pursue its intellectual property rights
in the '481 patent's implication in the adopted standard.' ° Dell sued no
participant and did not express the terms under which it would have licensed the
patent. The complaint and consent order did not reflect on the fact that VESA's
duty to disclose appeared to be limited to the personal knowledge of the
participants' representatives.
Consider the decisions of the FTC in Unocal and Rambus in light of Dell.
b. UnocaL Though not private standard-setting, the FTC's case against
Union Oil Company of California is another instance of allegations of
anticompetitive conduct based on breach of an alleged duty to disclose.'51 The
case is instructive as to the extent to which the FTC may be willing to go to imply
a duty to disclose. The allegations were based upon Unocal's having participated
in a standard-setting process in the late 1980s undertaken by the California Air
Resources Board, a department of the California Environmental Protection
Agency, for a summer formula for gasoline intended to be "low emissions,
reformulated gasoline (RFG).' ' - At the center of this case were the questions of
whether there existed a duty to disclose and, if so, whether that duty had been
violated. The case also involves Unocal's alleged failure to disclose its intellectual
property interests in two oil industry associations, Air/oil Group and Western
States Petroleum Association, and Unocal's allegedly modifying claims under
existing patent applications to cover the standard finally adopted.
The FTC's complaint against Unocal alleged the company "engaged in unfair
methods of competition through knowing and willful representations" to the
CARB and competitors in two industry associations."' The complaint alleged
that those representations "(1) induced CARB to adopt reformulated gasoline
standards that substantially overlapped Unocal's patent claims and (2) induced
other refiners to reconfigure their refineries in ways that subsequently exposed

149 Id

,5, Id at 618, 8.
'5' In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,2003), availabkat http://www.ftc.gov/
os/adjpro/d9305/idex.htm. Unocal, at the times relevant to the FTC complaint, was a vertically
integrated oil company that produced, refined, and marketed petroleum products.
152 Complaint of the FTC, In m Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar.
4, 2003), availabk
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adipro/d9305/index.htm. CARB is a governmental body and used a
formal rulemaking process to adopt the formula standard. The standard, once adopted, had the
force and effect of law, magnifying the effect of any anticompetitive conduct.
113 Opinion of the Commission at 1, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C.
July 7,2004),
availabk at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9305/index.htm.
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them to Unocal's patent claims."' 5' 4 The complaint's alleged anticompetitive
conduct fell into three categories: (1) Unocal's breach of a duty imposed by the
quasi-judicial nature of CARB's proceedings to disclose to CARB and other
participants patents that related to the standard CARB finally adopted; (2)
Unocal's conduct that engendered a reliance on the "non-proprietary" nature of
the standard, leading to CARB's adopting the standard and substantial reliance by
competitors in which they invested billions of dollars in compliance; and (3)
Unocal's modifying claims in pending applications to cover the standard CARB
adopted.'55
The complaint alleged that Unocal "willfully engaged in anticompetitive and
exclusionary acts" beginning in the 1990s and continuing through the complaint
by which "it wrongfully obtained monopoly power in the technology market" for
California's summer gasoline formula; Unocal was in dangerous probability of
monopolization as a result of "a specific intent to monopolize" that technology
market and the market for downstream goods; and Unocal actually "unreasonably
restrained trade in the technology market and downstream goods. 56
The FTC's administrative law judge (ALJ)granted Unocal's motion to dismiss
all allegations involved in the complaint regarding Unocal's conduct toward
CARB.' 7 He found that CARB's rulemaking was quasi-legislative, not quasiadjudicative.5 8 Therefore, Unocal's activities were immune under the NoerrPennington Doctrine.159 The administrative judge further found that CARB's
process was not dependent on Unocal." 6 In granting Unocal's motion, the
administrative judge apparently took as fact that the FTC allegations relating to
Unocal's failure to inform CARB about its intention to enforce its IP rights
implicated amounted to a misrepresentation. 6 ' For instance, in his finding 31, the
ALJ took as fact the FTC allegation that Unocal did not disclose "material
information."' 6 2

14 Id
155See id
156Id at 15-16. FTC Administrative Law Judge Chappell included allegations of willfulness on
Unocal's part, perhaps in recognition of Commissioner Azcuenaga's dissent in In reDell Corp.
157Initial Decision of the Administrative LawJudge at 67, In reUnion Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305
(F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
158

Id

159
161

Id
Id at 43, conclusions of law at 68.

161

Id at 18-19.

162

Id at 18 ("Although Unocal knew by July 1992 that most of the pending patent claims based

on its emissions research had been allowed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Unocal did not disclose this material information to CARB and other participants in the CARB RFG
proceedings.").
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The administrative law judge held that, as to the FTC's allegations about
Unocal's participation involving two private associations, the Air/Oil Group and
the Western States Petroleum Association, resolution of the issues demanded
resort to patent law and were beyond the jurisdiction of the FTC. 6" FTC
Complaint Counsel appealed.
The FTC, in a decision written by then Chairman Muris, reversed the decision
of the administrative law judge and remanded the case for further proceedings."
The Commission based its decision on Unocal's "alleged misrepresentations to
CARB"'' and the Commission's conclusion that the Noerr-Penningtonimmunity
does not protect the conduct alleged by the complaint.'66
The Complaint made no allegation that the test data Unocal supplied was
incorrect or misleading, and Unocal made no representation that it would not
enforce its IP rights. The allegations dealing with misrepresentation are
predicated upon Unocal's not disclosing its intention to assert its patent rights
that was implicated in CARB's standard.
The Commission makes no express finding about the misrepresentation.' 67
Neither did the Initial Decision. The Commission's decision must, therefore,
base its conclusion that the allegations made out a claim of misrepresentation on
Unocal's intentions, Unocal's denying a proprietary interest in test data it provided
for its TSO formula, Unocal's knowing failure to disclose its prosecution of the
'393 patent, 6 ' and CARB's alleged dependence upon Unocal's information and
its "expectation" that Unocal would not enforce any IP rights.'69 The decision
bases the implication on Unocal's representation that its test data would "show
that 'cost-effective' regulations could be achieved through adoption of a
'predictive model' and to convince CARB of the importance of T50."' 7 The
Commission found the Complaint sufficient, based upon its allegation that
"Unocal failed to disclose that it had pending patent rights, that its patent claims

163

Id at 67.

164 Opinion of the Commission at 54, In r Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7,2004),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9305/index.htm.
165

Id at 3.
at 54.

166 Id
167

Opinion of the Commission, In rn Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
161 U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393 (issued Feb. 22, 1994).
169 Opinion of the Commission at 5, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7,2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9305/index.htm ("[Tihe Complaint alleges that
'Unocal's misrepresentations and materially false and misleading statements caused CARB to adopt
[a standard] that substantially overlapped with Unocal's concealed patent claims.").
170 Id. at 6-7.
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overlapped with the proposed RFG regulations and that Unocal intended to
charge royalties."''
The ALJ's decision dismissing the complaint had found that CARB was a
governmental body, that its rulemaking was quasi-legislative and, therefore, that
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protected Unocal's actions lobbying for adoption
of a standard that was beneficial to its own market position. This immunity has
been defined in a series of decisions and the lobbying has been immune from
antitrust remedy under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, even when substantial
market power has been conferred by the governmental action. 2
The courts have extended the Noerr-Penningtonimmunity to misrepresentations
in legislative and quasi-legislative proceedings by legislatures and administrative
bodies, respectively, where lobbying is an inherent part of the proceeding.' 713 They
have not extended the immunity to misrepresentations in quasi-judicial
proceedings in which there is an expectation and dependence on veracity."'
The Commission's decision holds that "misrepresentation may sometimes
vitiate the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine."' 5 The decision asserts that Supreme
Court law considering the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is
unsettled and that appellate courts have recognized that the exception may apply
in judicial and administrative proceedings.' 76 The Commission concludes that
"the case law suggests an inquiry focused on whether a proceeding is political or
non-political, rather than on whether it is quasi-legislative or quasiadjudicatory."' 77
The Commission's decision, having analyzed decisions governing application
of the Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine, considers the underlying public policy. 78 The

1' Id.at 5.
172See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500; UnitedMine Vorkers of Am., 381 U.S. 657;

NoerrMotor Freigbt,365 U.S. 127.
"I'Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. 492; Cal. Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972).
'71 Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641 (1993).
175 Opinion of the Commission at 10, In r Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7,2004),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
"' CARB's deliberations appear quasi-legislative, not quasi-adjudicatory in nature. The
Commission finds the deliberations non-political, finding an expectation and dependence the
integrity of Unocal's test data and a narrow discretion. I find no allegation that the test data was
inaccurate. Rather, the Commission's analysis assumes that Unocal's communications imply that the
company either (1) had no intellectual property interests or (2) had no intention of enforcing any
intellectual property rights and that alleged implication amounted to a misrepresentation. Id at 3743.
177

Id at 31-32.

Id at 19 (quoting Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247,1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ('We see no reason
to believe that the right to petition includes a right to file deliberately false complaints ....
'
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Commission's decision denied a "legal framework" for the application of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine that is predicated on a "political/non-political"
demarcation. The Commission's decision then provides criteria relevant to the
determination whether the Noerr-Pennington immunity protected "the nature of
government expectations; the degree of governmental discretion; the extent of
necessary reliance on petitioners' factual assertions; and the ability to determine
79
causation, linking the government's actions to petitioner's communications."'
After weighing these criteria against argument Complaint Counsel's Commission,
the decision held that "there is no basis either in policy or in the nature and
context of Unocal's communications to CARB for dismissing the Complaint as
a matter oflaw."'' "
The decision imputed a misrepresentation, though there is no allegation that
the data provided by Unocal was inaccurate or misleading. The complaint
contained no allegation that Unocal expressly asserted an intention not to enforce
any intellectual property rights.
The Commission's decision held that the complaint, if proved true, makes out
a cause of action.' 8 ' In so holding, the decision found it sufficient that the
complaint alleged CARB's reliance on the test data, the agency's limited discretion
with an allegation that a Unocal communication "created a 'materially false and
misleading impression was the quid pro quo for CARB's 'agreement to develop
a predictive model,'" and that Unocal had "created the misleading impression that
it had agreed to give up any 'competitive advantage' it may have had" relating to
its purported invention and arising from its emissions research results and that
Unocal's statement suppressed the 'material fact that assertion of its proprietary
right should materially increase the cost and reduce the flexibility of the proposed
' 82

regulations."'

CARB and the participants in the other two organizations involved in the
CARB rulemaking had it within their power before adoption of the formula
standard to expressly inquire from Unocal what Unocal's intentions were with
respect to enforcement of its intellectual property rights in its T50 formula. They
chose not to, and the FTC chose to allege a Unocal misrepresentation based upon
an implication of Unocal's communications with CARB and two associations.'83

However, broad the First Amendment right to petition may be, it cannot be stretched to cover

petitions based on known falsehoods.")).
79 Id.at 32.
188 Id at 45
181 Id
112

Id at 5 (emphasis added).

'1"

See id
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c. Rambus. The Federal Trade Commission filed its complaint against
Rambus on June 18, 2002, 84 at the time the Federal Circuit was considering the
appeal from the jury verdict and judgment of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The complaint made out two counts under section 5 of the FTC Act by
willfully engaging in anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct that leads to
achieving (1) "monopoly power in the synchronous DRAM technology market
and narrower markets encompassed therein" and (2) with specific intent to
monopolize those markets, achieving a "dangerous probability of
monopolization" in each of those markets.'
The complaint listed the anticompetitive effects of Rambus's conduct on
synchronous technology as: (1) increased royalties in its manufacture, sale, or use;
(2) increases in its price or reductions in its use; (3) decreased incentives to
produce memory-using technology; (4) decreased incentives for participation in
standard-setting organizations; 18 and
(5) decreased reliance on the industry
6
standard-setting collaborations.
The complaint alleged that Rambus made only "limited and misleading
disclosures" during the pendency of its participation in the standard-setting
process.'87 The facts indicate that Rambus disclosed the written description of a
patent which shared the same written description with the patent it subsequently
sought to enforce and that another participant disclosed a WIPO application. 88
The complaint stated that any effort by JEDEC to identify a replacement, noninfringing standard would have been impractical.189
These counts were based upon a breach of a duty to disclose and the
amending claims of pending patent applications to cover a proposed standard for
SDRAM. The complaint alleged that JEDEC, the private standard-setting
organization involved, maintained a steadfast policy against adopting standards
that would give "a competitive advantage to any manufacturer, [or exclude]
competitors from the market.""19 The complaint asserts thatJEDEC maintained

'

Administrative Complaint, In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. June 18, 2002), availabe at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm.
' Id at 32.
Id at 31. In addition, Rambus was accused of knowing destruction of documents.
Id.at 19-22.
"'
Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1085.
". Administrative Complaint at 27, In re
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. June 18,2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9302/index.htm. This allegation and the similar one in which
Unocalraise a question whether the FTC would assert that modifying claims to cover an evolving
standard is a sufficient basis, without allegations of failure to disclose, upon which to base an action
under § 5 of the FTC Act. Administrative Complaint at 14, In reUnion Oil Co., No. 9305 (F.T.C.
Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
"',
Id at 5 (quotingJolN'l'E.l.(tI'R )NDIvi(:iEN(;'(; COUN:Ii.,JEDEC PAT.NTPOI )ICY, supra
"I

"s
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"a commitment to avoid, where possible, the incorporation of patented
technologies into its published standards, or at a minimum to ensure that such
technologies, if incorporated, will be available on royalty-free or otherwise
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms."'' g The FTC's three counts have been
characterized as laying out "legal theories based in conventional antitrust
' 92
principles."'
On February 23, 2004, Chief Administrative Law Judge McGuire issued the
initial decision.' 3 His decision, echoing Judge Rader's decision, was a complete
rejection of the FTC complaint. He found that Rambus "did not have any
undisclosed patents or patent applications during the time that it was a JEDEC
member."'"'
He further held that JEDEC did not rely on Rambus's
misrepresentation or omission in arriving at the standard and any reliance would
have been unreasonable." 5 He found there to be no causal link between the
JEDEC standard-setting process and Rambus acquiring market power, and that
JEDEC was free to adopt standards that do not implicate Rambus's patents." 6
These three cases indicate that the FTC is willing to act as the surrogate for an
SSO and the co-participants in a standard-setting process, choosing to define a
cause of action centered on the duty to disclose."97 As currently administered, this
strategy is questionable. The FTC's approach allows SSO's current vague
communication of a duty to disclose to provide the basis for potential liability.
Also, firms wishing to participate in a standard-setting process may believe that
the others are complying with their interpretation of the duty to disclose or that
there is an effective remedy if not. The participants may, based upon that faith,
make business decisions, including substantial investments only to find that their

note 48).
1"'Id
1 2

Alden F. Abbott & Theodore A. Gebhard, Standard-Seting Disclosure Poiies: Evaluaing

Anitrust Concerns in Liaght of Ramubus, 16 ANTriRUST 29, 34 (2002) ("The Commission's attempted
monopolization claim requires proof that Rambus (1) possessed a specific intent to monopolize, and
(2) engaged in exclusionary conduct (3) giving rise to a dangerous probability of monopolization (but
not necessarily any actual adverse effect on competition) in one or more well-defined markets.")
Abbott and Gebhard further argue that the decision, if against Rambus, could not have been used
"by subsequent private plaintiffs as either pritwafaie evidence or collateral estoppel in their treble
damage actions." Id
"' Initial Decision of the Administrative LawJudge, In reRambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb.
23, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9302/index.htm.
'

Id.at 7.

,,5Id.
"' Id.Complaint counsel has appealed the initial decision.
197 Id
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faith was misplaced.'98 By choosing to enter the fray, the FTC has inhibited the
discovery of a standard-setting model that will work.
The breach of a duty to disclose is not an example of exclusion, nor is it an
example of designing out, and it is bounded by the ability to clearly define and
communicate the scope of the duty. The FTC has stated that a SSO need not
require disclosure.'9 9
IV.

CURRENT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Current legal scholarship is divided on the issue of standard-setting. The
proposals fall into three major categories: (1) how to make the disclosure
requirement enforceable, (2) whether and how to affect the pricing model, and (3)
whether and in what way antitrust scrutiny should be adjusted to free standardsetting from the risks of scrutiny as anticompetitive or how to maintain or
increase that scrutiny.
A. DISCLOSURE"

°

SSO participation today depends on the expression of and compliance with
a duty on the part of participants to disclose relevant intellectual property
interests. Dell, Unocal, and Rambus indicate that participant-patent owners take
advantage of the duty to disclose by not disclosing or by resigning before the duty
to disclose arises.2"' Participant-potential licensees have relied on compliance,
only to discover that after having made substantial investments to pursue the
standard, they are sued for patent infringement for practicing the standard. As
currently practiced, the duty to disclose is a paper tiger and provides a false sense
of security.

198 This premise is established by both the Complaint of the FTC, In ra Union Oil Co. of Cal.,

No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,2003), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm, and
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, Infineon TechAG, 318 F.3d 1081 (No. 03-37).
'9' See In re DellCorp., 121 F.T.C. at 626 ("Nor should this enforcement action contain a general
suggestion that standard-setting bodies should impose a duty to disclose."). Balto, supra note 23, at
14 recognized that a duty to disclose is not required in a standard-setting environment; however, he
suggests that SSOs use it as a "strong procompetinve signal." I discuss the inherent ineffectiveness
of the duty to disclose in Part V.A, infra.
In Part V, infra, I discuss the many challenges that confront a drafter of an enforceable duty
to disclose.
" In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004), availabk at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9302/index.htm (last visited Nov. 19,2004); In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C.
Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm; In ra Dell Corp., 121
F.T.C. 616.
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As indicated by the following discussion, legal scholars have made proposals
attempting to correct the current structural sloppiness in the SSO's expression of
the duty to disclose. These commentators have contemplated using existing or
proposed causes of action to enforce the duty to disclose in a standard-setting
exercise. Others have proposed a more clearly defined duty to disclose.
Professor Janice Mueller focuses on instances in which the government is a
driver in the standard-setting process. She argued that "patent owners should
have a mandatory obligation to disclose the existence of any patents or pending
patent applications that are material to the standard during their participation"'
to allow preservation "for the standard setting body... to decide whether it will
adopt a standard that requires the use of the patented technology or develop a
different standard that avoids it altogether., 213 She proposed a compulsory
licensing regime for private standard-setting.2 4 If a patent is implicated in a
standard set by a governmental body, the governmental body should exercise its
power of eminent domain as a remedy to the refusal to disclose or license all users
on commercially reasonable terms.20 5 If the failure to disclose was intentional, she
proposed the application of the patent misuse doctrine to deny both injunctive
relief and damages.20 6
Professor Mark Lemley contemplates means to make a duty to disclose
enforceable in his valuable work on standard-setting.2 7 He recognizes that SSO
policies are not themselves enforceable and that enforceability is a matter of
law. 2 ' A participant's mere membership is not sufficient to bind the participant
to the SSO's policies. 2 9 Professor Lemley considers the continuing duty to
disclose to terminate when the patent owner resigns. 20 He discusses whether the
bylaws of the SSO should be enforceable in contract law theory and whether the
parties should enter into a contract. 2 He considers whether the co-participants

202See Mueller, supra note 64, at 630-31. Professor Mueller opined that the enactment of the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(q), 113 Stat. 1536,
1501A-552 (1999),will increase the likelihood that standard-setting participants will disclose pending
patent applications, since the PTO will publish applications for which the applicant intends to file
internationally. Id at 647. This process will predictably increase the availability of patent
applications, but of whether the uncertainty applications fall within a duty to disclose and the risks
attendant to disclosure in standard-setting will remain.
213Mueller, supra note 64, at 666.
"" Id at 664-69.
2,,5
Id.at 660-64.
2,'
Id. at 669-84.
2,,7
Lemley, supra note 30.
2"'Id.at 1909-12.

-) Id.at 1911.
Id.at 1912-13.
2" Id.at 1909.
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should be considered third-party beneficiaries to a contract, able to enforce their
rights should they be sued for infringement of a standard in which the plaintiff
was a participant.21213 He discounts the value of injunctive relief as a vehicle to
enforce disclosure.
Professor Lemley recognizes that the duty to disclose suffers from many
214
weaknesses. He proposes that SSOs should (1) define the IP rights up front,
(2) make the obligations of participation clear and enforceable, 1 5 (3) require
disclosure only when balanced by a licensing duty,21 6 and (4) define certain
conditions for the license. 7
Professors Teece and Sherry have written an article concerning the level of
antitrust scrutiny; however, the professors make observations about the duty to
disclose.2 1 8 They write that to be meaningful, the duty to disclose must be
accompanied by a duty to search.219 They state that "overdisclosure can be as
problematic as underdisclosure" ' 22' and that "non-disclosure does not equal lack
of knowledge., 221 They assert that "by disclosing the results of its research to
Auto/Oil, Unocal presumably put other firms on notice that Unocal had
conducted its own research, and those firms should have reasonably inferred that
Unocal would have applied for a patent on its innovation. ' 222 Professors Teece
and Sherry advocate clarity of the conditions of participation 223 so the sanctions
of noncompliance are known.

212

Id at 1915.

213

Id at 1917 ("Injunctive relief compelling disclosure isn't a terribly effective remedy; a failure

to disclose the existence of an IP right is a problem only if people aren't aware of the IP right, and
if they aren't aware of it they can hardly know to sue.").
214

Id at 1957-59.

215

Id at 1960.

216

Id at 1960-62.

211Id at 1962-67.
21' Teece & Sherry, spra note 56, at 1945-51. The Teece and Sherry article will be further

discussed, infra, in the context of antitrust considerations.
219

Id at 1951.

_ Id at 1948.
2 Id at 1966.
-2 Id at 1966-67. Professors Teece and Sherry argue that Rambus did not disclose its patent
application toJEDEC and that the participants should have inferred the potential for the existence
of Rambus's interests from its international application. Id at 1967-68. Rambus made a disclosure
in 1993, and another participant made known Rambus's international application. Rambus, Inc. v.
Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1099, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3 Teece & Sherry, supra note 56, at 1970-71. Regarding disclosure, they advocate only that the
"rules be (1) clearly stated, (2) clearly communicated to participants, and (3) clearly enforced in an
even-handed manner. It is also important (4) that the consequences of a participant's failure to
comply with the rules be explicitly laid out." Professors Teece and Sherry only reluctantly classify
a conscious failure to disclose as manipulation of the standard-setting process. Id 1941-42.
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David Balto, former Assistant Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition,
recognizes that a strong disclosure system "involves important trade offs" by
firms in determining whether to participate in a standard-setting. But he states
that the existence of a disclosure system would "send a strong procompetitive
signal.

22 4

Most commentators on standard-setting are silent on a means to improve the
enforceability or reliability of the subject of disclosure, implicitly accepting it as-is.
Certain commentators that confront the duty to disclose advocate defining the
duty more clearly and in a manner that is enforceable. Professor Mueller
proposes that disclosure in standard-setting should be mandatory, and suggests
225
statutory or judicial remedies for the failure to disclose.
However, the proposals generally do not confront the inherent complexity of
disclosure by, for instance, defining the timing or scope of the duty to disclose,
or even suggesting what level of disclosure would satisfy the duty. The ideal
model must confront the vagaries of claim construction and both literal
infringement and doctrine of equivalents. In Part V, I present the many
advantages that will derive from jettisoning the duty to disclose from the model
for participation in a private standard-setting process.
B. LICENSING AND ROYALTIES

Several commentators have directed their proposals to the licensing
requirement that is common among SSO participation models today.226 Some of
these proposals hope to mitigate the affects of expost pricing by a change in
procedure or the law or both. Others reflect confidence in the current model,
advocating that implicated patentees deserve to receive a fair return on their
contribution to the state of the art.
No commentator advocates royalty-free licensing as a condition of
participation in standard-setting. However, Professor Mueller advocates the use
of the patent misuse doctrine as a remedy when a participant-patent owner
intentionally or willfully fails to disclose. 227 This proposed remedy amounts to
royalty free licensing. Professor Lemley finds eight standard-setting organizations
require royalty-free licensing as a condition of participation in a standard-setting
process. 22 This model, though clear, simple, and attractive from an antitrust
perspective, is anathema to the IP community. Royalty free licensing provides no

24 Balto, supra note 23.
22S Mueller,

spra note 64, at 630-31.
22'
Balto, supra note 23.
227 Seegeneraly Mueller, supra note 64, at 671.
' Lemley, supra note 30, at 1973.
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incentive for creation and may well act as a disincentive to participation in a
standard-setting organization. The remedies sought by the FTC or others in the
case of a breach of a duty to disclose have much the same effect of this option.
Citing Dell and Rambus, Professors Teece and Sherry criticize "antitrust
authorities" for seeking the equivalent of royalty-free licensing as a remedy for a
standard-setting participant's failure to disclose patents or applications that may
be implicated in an adopted standard. 229 The professors identify the shortcomings
of a duty to license under reasonable terms and conditions, including their expost
valuation of a patent implicated in the standard. 230 They do not propose a
solution to these specific shortcomings, but rely on SSO self-governance and
unfettered by close antitrust scrutiny to identify the appropriate licensing
requirement.231
On the other hand, James DeVellis advocates licensing on reasonable terms
and conditions 232 after contrasting the incentives associated with the patentee
receiving a return on its investment with an obligation to license on a royalty-free
233
He
SSOs.
basis, which is an alternative licensing obligation imposed by some
234
creation.
to
disincentive
a
is
reasons that royalty-free licensing
DeVellis finds the network effect that results from standard-setting to be one
of its most positive results. He argues that a royalty-free licensing requirement
will "stifle technology, reduce network benefits, and force inferior standards to
that has a higher likelihood of being more
compete against advanced technology
235
policy.
RAND
a
under
available
He concludes that "[m]ore than any other system, a RAND policy will result
in superior and widely implemented standards that will maximize interoperability
and create the atmosphere for continued scientific advancement, thus striking a
balance between236 the opposing domains of patent law and industry
standardization.,
DeVellis' model is largely the status quo. He is an advocate of standard-setting
and a defender of the common SSO requirement for RAND licensing. His
proposal does not offer a means to rectify the fact that RAND licensing

Teece & Sherry, supra note 56, at 1959.

23,,Id. at

1953-64.

_3 Id. at 1913.

232 DeVellis, supra note 59. DeVeflis, at 322-23, provides a sample of a reasonable terms and

conditions license and a sample of the requirements of a royalty free license.
211 Id. at 319-36.
2" Id. at 344.
235 Id. at 351.

The network effect is the result of the multiplier effect on technological
developments that occur after the adoption of a standard. The network effect is seen as beneficial
and a procompetitive effect of standard-setting. Balto, supra note 23, at 2.
216 DeVellis, supra note 59, at 351.
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institutionalizes an ex post royalty, and accepts the inflation in value that
accompanies the adoption of the patentee's technology as a standard. DeVellis's
advocacy of the RAND license compares only royalty-free licensing and RAND
licensing. 231 There is at least one other alternative, proposed by this Article.
Gordon Klancnik proposes to control the inflated expost valuation in a class
of cases involving a standard adopted by governmental action, 23' exemplified by
the V-chip and the clean-burning, summer gasoline case that was the subject of
Unocal23 He argues for enactment of a statute modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 1498,240
expanded to encompass standards established by state governments. 24' His goal
is to reform the current system, relying on the skills of the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit in determining "reasonable and entire
compensation., 24 2 This proposal is intended to moderate the inflated value of
patents once implicated in a governmentally established standard.24
This proposal may shorten the process of negotiating licenses and may create
a downward pressure on the royalty charged by the patent owner. As with many
of the proposals, the Klancnik proposal appears to contemplate that only one
firm holds the patent or patents and that those patents cover the entire standard.
The proposal does not discuss the means for identifying whether a patent is
actually implicated in the adopted standard. His proposal would alter the standard
for determining damages, limiting them to section 1498-like damages ("reasonable
and entire compensation" versus "reasonable royalty" that could be trebled).-"

3 See the discussion of RAND licensing infra Part IV.
23

Gordon Klancnik,A ProposaltoResolve InfringementInducedby GovernmentalFiat,70 G Eo. WAsii.

L. REV. 806 (2002).
29 Id at 808.
S1M at 812. That statute provides a remedy for infringement by or on behalf of the Federal
government. It assures the patent holder a right to sue for damages, that is, "reasonable and entire
compensation" in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
"4 Klancnik, supra note 238, at 819-20. Klancnik states that for his proposal to successfully
encompass the states, those jurisdictions would have to waive their sovereign immunity for this
purpose.
242 Id at 828-29. Klancnik's proposal would exclude "attorney's fees" from the § 1498 damages.
Klancnik, spra note 238, at 808, states:
Rather than maintain the status quo, where the patentee maintains total control
over licensing, this Note's solution would require a new statute. This statute
would provide for appropriate compensation in light of all the circumstances and
would derive the appropriate measure of damages from existing law with respect
to the federal government's direct use of patented technology and eminent
domain jurisprudence. Under the proposed statute, the patent holder would lose
both its right to exclude others from using its patent and its right to enhanced
damages and attorney's fees without giving up the right to receive reasonable and
entire compensation.
Id at 828; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
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His proposal applies to cases subject to an adopted governmental (federal or
state) standard.245 Klancnik asserts that the proposed statute, if enacted, would
result in a fair royalty that would minimize standard-setting inflation.246
Klancnik's proposed system amounts to a forced RAND license and would result
in expost valuation of the implicated patent.
Professor Mueller's proposal is similar to Klancnik's suggestion. Her proposal
would apply "particularly [to] a standard pertaining to public health and safety"
that was the product of the Federal government, 247 and would threaten a nondisclosing patentee with exercise of eminent domain powers to preclude inflated
valuation. 2 ' Her intended result would not necessarily follow since the value
would be determined expost.
Professor Patterson proposes a change in current practice intended to
moderate the inflationary effects on the value of a patent resulting from being
implicated in the standard. 249 He would allow the SSO, as the owner of the
standard,250 to negotiate a license with the patentee as2 a means to control the
patentee's ability to charge an excessive royalty expost. 11
The Patterson proposal departs from current practice, but it has many
weaknesses. First, it relies on disclosure.252 Reliance on effective disclosure can
prove the undoing of any substitute system as will be discussed in Part V.A, infra.
Other practical considerations argue against the effectiveness of Patterson's
proposal. SSOs facilitate standard-setting processes; they do not negotiate
licenses. This proposed role would require the reconstitution of SSOs because
they have no inherent knowledge of the value of the technology in the
marketplace or the investment necessary to arrive at the implicated patent.
Finally, under Patterson's proposal, the negotiations must take place after a
standard is either adopted or all but adopted, because an SSO could only negotiate
with a patentee after identifying the likely standard and the implicated patentee.
The result of negotiating at this point would likely be expost pricing, even using

Klancnik, supra note 238, at 808.

246Id. at 829.
7 Mueller, supra note 64, at 684.
'4, Id. at 663. Mueller recognizes that "[blecause it is based on the federal Constitution, this
eminent domain proposal does not address the problem of capture of standards mandated by state
governments, such as the CARB clean gasoline formulations in the Unocal case."
24 Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and IntellectualPropery, 17 BIT-RKIF.IAY T[.CH.
L.J. 1043, 1044 (2002); see also Patterson, Antitrust and the Costs of Standard-Setting: A Comnmentay on
Teece and Sherry, supra note 58.
2, Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards,and IntellectualProperty, supranote 249, at 1044.
's Id. at 1083 ("It is clear, though that current rules allow patentees to threaten discriminatorily
large fees from some standards users. By eliminating that market failure, this proposal will likely
provide better correspondence between financial returns and innovative contributions.").
_52Id. at 1063.
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the royalty determining scenario's presented here, unless the SSO is willing to
move to another standard.5 3
Patrick Curran advocates a system similar to Patterson's, but his proposal
focuses on a rule of per se legality in regard to the antitrust risks inherent in
Patterson's proposal.2 4 Curran's proposal is limited to single-source patents
implicated in the standard and has, as its goal, to obviate the need for vague "fair,"
"reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" language in SSO policies, "thereby eliminating
high risk litigation over the specific meaning of those terms and preserving
incentives to participate.2 55
Curran's solution is complex, proposing that the SSO could negotiate a license
with the single patent owner before the standard is adopted.2 56 As with
Patterson's proposal, Curran would substantially alter the SSO's role to require
SSOs to develop licensing capabilities.257 Participants and nonparticipants,
including antitrust authorities, may view SSOs and the standard-setting process
differently, increasing anticompetitive concerns. 58
Curran's proposal (1) assumes disclosure; (2) requires identification of the
standard, meaning expost pricing; and (3) does not contemplate more than one
patent owner's patent being implicated in the adopted standard.
As to a requirement that a participant license on a royalty-free basis, the
commentators recognize the effect of adoption of a standard on those who hold
an implicated patent or other intellectual property interests on the value of those
rights. As recognized by Teece and Sherry, royalty-free licensing results in

231
Id.
at 1079-80. SSOs have shown no willingness to move to alternate standards in any of the
significant cases that have thus far arisen. Unocalis the most dramatic example. In the face of (1)
Unocal's arguments that the standard should be a broader standard, (2) of the potential direct effect
of Unocal's royalty demands being passed along to California's drivers, and (3) of the FTC case
against Unocal, CARB still has refused to move from its standard. See In reUnion Oil Co. of Cal.,
No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,2004), availabkathttp://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm. Once
a standard setting process has achieved a consensus, inertia preventing consideration of a
replacement standard apparently sets in.
254Curran, supra note 22, at 1001.
25sId at
256 Id. at

992-93.
984.

251 Id ("In this Comment, I argue that the goals of antitrust enforcement would be best
served
by allowing SSOs to operate without fear of antitrust liability when fixing the price terms of licenses
for single-source patents."). Curran is not the only commentator to build single source patents into

his proposal. In fact, none of the other commentators dealt with the antitrust and other complexities
introduced when the adopted standard implicates patents owned by more than one patentee. The
proposal advanced in this Article expressly includes provision for multiple patentees being implicated
in a standard. See infraPart V.
258See infra Part IV.c (further discussing Curran's proposal, among other, advocating the
alteration of antitrust scrutiny).
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clarity259 and is simple because no computation is necessary. This option disarms
the pricing enigma of ex ante versus ex post pricing by avoiding it. However,
royalty-free is, in substance, a penalty. It allows no return for the creativity and
investment in the patents finally implicated by the selected standard.
By requiring the forbearance of royalty, SSOs would risk the participation of
the firms that are most likely to contribute to the adoption of the most effective
standard. Firms have an obligation to their stockholders and boards of directors
to receive a return that bears a resemblance to the investment. 2 °
Royalty-free licensing is clean and safe from an antitrust perspective.
However, in any attempt to cut the Gordian knot of standard-setting, antitrust
concerns, and intellectual property, royalty-free licensing offers no advantage.
One commentator advocated expost pricing as desirable and as an incentive
261
for technological development where the standard reflects increased efficiency.
This view asserts that standard-setting should not measurably detract from a
firm's right to maximize royalties. 262 The adoption of a standard implicating a
patent reflects the inherent value of the technology, represents the fact that the
technology is the most efficient, and has the power of the industry consensus in
competition with any competing technology not chosen. 263 But once adopted, the
patent owner is the beneficiary of an instant increase in the value of the
technology. The inflation of the value is analogous to that of an adjacent plot of
land after the route for a new interstate has been identified.
This view would provide the patent owner with a windfall as a result of the
standard's implicating a participant's patent. There is little difference between this
position and those that advocate a RAND licensing requirement. Commenters
advocating the remaining two positions and antitrust authorities are together
seeking to control the uncontrolled pursuit of maximizing the windfall of expost
pricing.
Another category of licensing proposals asserts that the RAND license is an
appropriate method to control any inflation in the value of the technology. 2 4 I
include in this school the proposals for the SSOs to act as negotiating agents

259Teece & Sherry, supra note 56, at 1954-55.
2" Lemley, supra note 30, at 1907 ("If the SSO in question is one of the few that compels
assignment or royalty-free licensing or requires search for IP, the decision to join may inadvertently
commit the company to give up major IP rights."). Professor Lemley also notes that twenty-nine
of the thirty-six SSOs he surveyed required a nondiscriminatory license under reasonable terms and
conditions. Id He further noted that, "relatively few SSOs gave much explanation of what those
terms mean or how licensing disputes would be resolved." Id at 1906.
261 See Patterson, Inventions, Indusry Standards,and IntellectualProperty, supra note 249, at 1070.
262

Id

263 Id
21,1 See DeVellis,

supra note 59.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss1/7

46

Webb: There Is a Better Way: It's Time to Overhaul the Model for Partic

2004]

OVERHAULING THE STANDARD-SETTING MODEL

209

upon identification of a patent implicated in an adopted or proposed standard.
This view appears to impose a counterbalance to ex post pricing, but the
counterbalance is illusory. When an SSO requires that the patent owner license
on reasonable terms and conditions, the adoption of the standard, not the
technology's success in the marketplace, acts to inflate the value of the particular
technology. The day before a standard is adopted, the technology would have had
to compete in the marketplace and have a value set by its inherent advantages, if
they existed. The day after the SSO adopts a standard, the market value of the
implicated technology increases, though the technology itself has not improved.
The current cases indicate an inertia associated with a completed standardsetting process inhibits alteration of the adopted standard. The Unocal case
demonstrates this fact: in the face of Unocal's assertion of its intent to maximize
its royalty position, CARB did not act to alter the standard it chose.265 It could
have adopted the standard Unocal had advocated, a performance standard, rather
than a "design" standard that put Unocal in the controlling position. Likewise,
JEDEC has not chosen to seek an alternative in the face of Rambus's lawsuits. 266
The final set of proposals advocate governmental intervention in cases in
which the government is the driver for the standard, or if the standard involves
health and safety issues. 267 These proposals also would result in expost pricing.
The ideal model would present an opportunity to arrive at ex ante pricing,
assuring a fair return on a technology but not allowing for inflation due to the
technology's being implicated in the standard. The ideal model would not depend
upon government intervention.
C. ANTITRUST

As indicated in Part II, supra, the problem in standard-setting exists at the
confluence of intellectual property law and antitrust law. Several scholars have
attempted to find a resolution of the standard-setting dilemma in antitrust law.
Some view the current level of scrutiny or the guidelines for assessing
anticompetitive conduct in the context of standard-setting as appropriate. 6 8
Others argue for loosening the standard in recognition of the inherently
procompetitive attributes of standard-setting.269 Some of the latter category of

215 See In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003), availabk athttp://www.ftc.

gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm.
' Initial Decision of the Administrative LawJudge 219-24. In trRambus,Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C.
Feb. 23, 2004), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9302/index.htm.
267 See Mueller, supra note 64.
2' See Balto, spra note 23.
.6.See Teece & Sherry, supra note 56.
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commenters argue for expanding the role that SSOs play in a licensing and royalty
setting. 270
David Balto views standard-setting as having procompetitive effects in
increasing price competition, compatibility and interoperability, and in allowing
increased use of particular technologies. 2 11 On the other hand, Balto identifies the
anticompetitive potential resulting from collusive conduct.27 2 In the past,
participants have used standard-setting organizations to establish a monopoly or
to exclude technology that was at least competitive if not improved over the then
controlling standard. 273 Thus, standard-setting can "thwart innovation or
entrench an older standard... Standard setting can also provide a forum for
setting may adversely affect
collusion, either tacit or explicit . . . . Standard
274
substantively."
or
procedurally
competition
Professor Lemley expresses a concern over the threat of governmental action,
particularly, "overzealous antitrust enforcement. ' 27 ' Former FTC Commissioner
Deborah K. Owen has offered four tenets that would ease antitrust scrutiny of
standard-setting. Ms. Owen's position is:
First, a firm attempting to influence standard setting in an
association should scrupulously abide by the procedural rules of the
organization-both their letter and spirit .... Second, a standard
setting organization may reduce its antitrust risk by including
representatives from different levels of the industry, and in
particular both buyers and sellers, in the standard setting
process ....Third, a standard setting body may reduce its antitrust
risk by having a reasonable basis in fact and in science for the
standard that it promulgates .... Fourth, in general, agreements
among competitors to manufacture or sell only products that
comply with an industry standard are risky. Stated differently, an
association's product standards should generally be voluntary rather
than mandatory. One of the factors that the Commission considers
is what efforts, if any, the association took to enforce its rules
against noncomplying members. 276

27' See Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards,and Intelkctual Property, supra note 249.
271

Balto, supra note 23, at 3-4.

272Id at 4.
273

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).

_" Balto, supra note 23, at 4.
27, Lemley, supra note 30, at 1892. Professor Lemley advocates reliance on SSO self-governance
with standard-setting's being subjected to antitrust scrutiny only reluctantly. Id at 1969.
27' Deborah K. Owen, Comments before the Compressed Gas Association at its 1994 annual
meeting in Washington, D.C., in David A. Bagwell, "Keeping Antitrust Simple: 'Your Momma's
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Advocates- of the so-called Chicago school of antitrust analysis would argue
that there should be little if any government intervention where, as with private
standard-setting, there are strong indications of market efficiency. They recognize
a need for government involvement only in the presence of agreements or
mergers that concentrate market power to a very high degree. 77 This view would
comport with those that suggest a reduced level of antitrust scrutiny for per se
legality of standard-setting activities.
Professor Weiser offers the view that the Internet provides a model for
standard-setting that minimizes governmental regulation and reliance on selfregulation.2 8 Biester echoes that view, relying on the antitrust enforcement
guidelines promulgated jointly by the Department of Justice and the FTC and a
series of pooling review letters issued by the FTC.27 9
Professors Teece and Sherry join in expressing concern about an aggressive
FTC. They advocate that the FTC regulate sparingly and act on a case-by-case
' 2
basis, asserting that no" 'one size fits all' antitrust policy is appropriate. , ' Teece
and Sherry accept that superior technology deserves its inflated position (1) as an
incentive to invest, (2) to satisfy the market's need or desire for compatibility, and
(3) to overcome inertia to change. They accept that once a patent is adopted as

Rules for Attending Meetings,"' 48th Annual Spring Meeting, ABA Section of Antitrust Law 32-33
(Apr. 7,2000), availbkathttp://www.abanet.org/ftp/antitrust/comnittees/counsel/keepanti. doc.
Ms. Owen's first point demands scrupulous compliance with a duty to disclose and licensing
obligations.
217 Malcolm B. Coate &Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-ChicagoEconomicsSurvive Daubert?,34 AKRON
L. RiV. 795, 796 (2001). Coate and Fischer cite works by judges Bork and Posner. See also Lloyd
Constantine, Challenges to the ChicagoApproach: An Antitrust Enforcer Confronts the New Economics, 58
ANTIRUsr L.J. 661, 662 (1989):
The core idea of Chicago School antitrust is simply that the antitrust laws were
intended to and should focus exclusively on a 'welfare' analysis of restraints of
trade. Restraints are bad only insofar as they diminish 'consumer welfare.' The
Chicago School definition of 'consumer welfare' focuses on economic efficiency,
not on wealth transfers from consumers to producers. The reduction in
allocative efficiency that may result from a merger or other arrangement
conferring market power may be easily offset quantitatively by even modest
efficienci es realized by the arrangement.
Lloyd Constantin was formerly the Chief of the Antitrust Bureau in the Office of the Attorney
General in the State of New York.
2" Weiser, supra note 28, at 846 ("The FCC's order is a model, however, in avoiding unnecessary
government standard setting by providing incentives for private parties to do so.").
21' Edward G. Biester, III,An Overiewofthe IP-AntitrustIntersection: Reevaluatingthe 1995Antitrust
Guidefknesfor the Licensing of IntelkctualPrperty,16 ANTITRUSi 8, 13 (2002) ("The Guidelines have
stood up because they articulate efficiency and consumer benefits and competitive concerns and
stress the flexibility of the rule of reason. The Agencies should hold that course."). These letters
will be discussed in greater detail in Part V of this Article, infra.
2"' Teece & Sherry, supra note 56, at 1985-87.
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a standard the patent owner is "locked-in." 28' However, they assert that
alternative technologies, pre-existing blocking patents, and subsequent
developments may displace and, therefore, limit the patent owner's ex post
advantage.282
. The professors assert that the law should distinguish between active
manipulation within the standard-setting process (i.e., modifying the patent to
cover the standard or advocating a standard that implicates a participant's patent),
deserving a harsher remedy than passive manipulation (i.e., failure to disclose an
implicated patent).283 The professors posit that passive manipulation, though a
major focus of antitrust concerns in standard-setting, is less likely to succeed.284
Teece and Sherry criticize the current remedies sought in cases like Dell and
Rambus- that is, the loss of the right to enforce where a participant has not
disclosed implicated patents, the equivalent of a forced royalty-free license. 28 5
They assert that royalty-free licensing may be simple and clear but offers a
disincentive to research and development. 286 They argue against the negotiation
role for SSOs 287 and recognize that the RAND licensing requirement merely
institutionalizes expost valuation 88
Professors Teece and Sherry assert that experimentation is necessary and
should not be endangered by overly active antitrust supervision and intervention,
which runs the risk of delaying the adoption of standards, thereby reducing the
2 89
economic gains from standardization and reducing social welfare generally.
Therefore, they propose that "antitrust authorities must regulate sparingly, with
no presumption that a 'one size fits all' antitrust policy is appropriate ....290
Professor Michael Carrier accepts the thrust of the Teece and Sherry
article-that antitrust scrutiny should be limited.29' Rather than advocating that
limitation on antitrust scrutiny on pragmatic considerations, he argues that the
limitation "can comfortably be grounded in the heart of antitrust: in the lack of
significant anticompetitive effects and in the presence of powerful procompetitive justifications. 292
281 Id

at 1940-41.

282 Id

28"Id at 1941-42.
284 I
2 5 Id at 1959-60.
28 Id.at 1955.

2" Id at 1959.
288 Id at 1957.
211U at 1986.
i at 1913.
2,1Michael A. Carrier, Why Antitrust Should Defer to the Intelketual PropertyRuks of Standard-Setting
Organizations: A Commentary on Teece & Sherr, 87 MINN. L. RnV. 2019 (2003).
-*Id at 2037.
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Carrier asserts that application of standard analytical structure leads to a
limited role for antitrust in a standard-setting. 293 He believes that standard-setting
differs from "suspicious arrangements," which encompass "horizontal
competitors that conspire[ ] to raise price or to reduce output" in standardsetting's procompetitive character.29 Carrier argues for recognizing that the
"limited importance of setting the standard in relation to the benefit of practicing
the standard reduces antitrust concern"; and that "the outsider often has influence
far beyond its market share. '295 He posits that blanket licenses, cross licenses, and
pool licenses operate to "resolve patent bottlenecks among owners of blocking
patents that otherwise could unilaterally prevent the practice of a product with
multiple patented inputs." 296
Finally, Carrier lists standard-setting's
procompetitive effects and concludes that "antitrust should defer to nearly all
' 297
SSO rules restricting IP.
Curran went Teece and Sherry and Carrier one better. In pursuing his
redesigned role for SSOs as the negotiating agent in standard-setting, Curran
argues that standard-setting should be designated as per se legal. 298 While
standard-setting is generally recognized as procompetitive, such sweeping changes
in antitrust considerations are dangerous. Proposed solutions should not create
equivalent or larger problems in different areas. We should not stanch one
wound only to open another.

293

Id.at 2019-20.

214Id at 2032.

295Id at 2032-33.
296 Id at 2034-35.
217 Id at 2037.
29' Curran, supra note 22, at 1003, states:

Under the proposed bargaining system, SSOs would be free to consider specific
license terms as part of their negotiations with patent owners and could require
patent owners to offer SSO members patent licenses with specific price, output,
and length terms before adopting a proprietary technology as an industry
standard. By including price as an element of the SSO selection process, SSOs
would be free to balance the technological advantages of a proprietary standard
against its owner's pricing requirements, making decisions based both on
technical excellence as well as access to the standard.
This proposal compels consideration of whether SSOs have expertise to understand and negotiate
a royalty that reflects the actual market value and to gain the expertise and resources to actually carry
out the job proposed. In addition, Curran's proposal depends upon a duty to disclose because the
SSO could negotiate only if it knew the putative standard and the patentee. The use of the SSO as
the negotiator and effective owner of the standard has the potential for limiting licensees to those
who are members of the SSO. To the extent that Curran's proposal results in limiting access to the
license that would be negotiated, he increases the likelihood of antitrust scrutiny and the proposal's
failing a rule of reason analysis.
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Professor Patterson, however, advocates an active role for antitrust law in
standard-setting to assure that "the patentees of inventions incorporated in
industry standards do not extract royalties that go beyond the value of the
inventions to include the value of standardization."' 29 He proposes that the law
recognize the value of standard-setting separate from the inventions that are
incorporated from them.0
Timothy Muris, former FTC chairman, laid out an aggressive course for the
FTC's policing of antitrust activity, including standard-setting. 31 This included
Dell and the FTC case against Rambus.0 2
The Teece and Sherry proposal and other proposals calling for a reduction of
antitrust scrutiny of standard-setting as a means to reduce the uncertainty
associated with participation in a standard-setting process actually endanger the
recognition of standard-setting as procompetitive when its value in the
marketplace is at its height and continues to grow with technological
Standard-setting offers an opportunity for collusive,
development.
anticompetitive conduct.
The Balto and Patterson proposals argue for the continuation of rule-ofreason scrutiny to maintain a proper balance between the potential for
anticompetitive conduct in a standard-setting situation. These proposals advocate
the status quo. Rule of reason analysis is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
The ideal system would require no alteration to antitrust oversight in
recognition of the potential for collusive conduct in negotiations and other
activities of the SSO and its members.
No commentators discuss the circumstance in which a standard implicates
more than one patent or patentee. 3 3 Curran argues that multiple patentees

2,)9

Patterson, supra note 58, at 2017.

v'Muris, supra note 37, at 363, states:
Four general principles should form the development of the FTC's competition
policy strategy and the preparation of a positive agenda for executing the
strategy. The Commission should: Play an active role in promoting competition
as the basic principle of economic organization through strong enforcement and
focused advocacy; Focus its antitrust enforcement resources on conduct that
poses the greatest threat to consumer welfare; Make full use of the agency's
distinctive institutional capabilities by applying the entire range of its policy
instruments to solve competition policy problems; and Attach a high priority to
improving the institution and process by which antitrust policy is formulated and
applied.
Time will tell whether Chairman Muris's successor, Deborah Platt Majoras, will continue to pursue
the current FTC attention to standard-setting.
,2Id. at 395-96.
"' See Klancnik, supra note 238. Klancnik's proposed statutory system would not depend upon
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increase the risk of anticompetitive conduct. 3 4 The model proposed would
provide for multiple patents and patentees and for licensing the implicated patents
to third parties.30 5
V. THE NEW MODEL FOR SSO PARTICIPATION
The current model is broken. It is not satisfactory because it suffers from a
lack of predictability for companies and the accompanying business, as well as
legal risks associated with participation in a standard-setting process. As a result,
companies that are well informed as to the current state of the law surrounding
standard-setting may be rethinking the advantages of participation versus the risks
associated with that participation. The current model results in ex post basis
pricing. The proposals discussed in Part IV, supra, offer little or nothing that
would alter that result.
This Article proposes a defined path toward a solution. The model will
provide predictability in the place of uncertainty, and will provide ex ante pricing
in place of ex post pricing. It will make participation in standard-setting
substantially safer from a legal standpoint and will protect intellectual property
interests without increasing the risks of antitrust violations. In fact, unless
abused, the antitrust risks will be negligible.
Adoption of the proposal propounded here will comfort companies that are
disquieted by the risks of participation in the standard-setting process. Those
firms could confidently elect to participate, ending the threat to standard-setting,
and the economy at large would benefit from a robust standard-setting process.
A. JETTISON DISCLOSURE AS A PRECONDITION TO PARTICIPATION

Disclosure cannot be redeemed and is destined to fail. Disclosure does not
and cannot achieve its intended purpose. The duty to disclose is not defined.
The duty to disclose is not enforceable. Above all, the duty to disclose is not
necessary. Removing the duty to disclose will improve standard-setting processes
and will mitigate or remove the risks to participation.

participation. See also Mueller, supra note 64. Mueller's system would likewise not depend on
participation.
3 Curran, supranote 22, at 1004.
Standard-setting would find the situation where a third party owns a blocking patent to
present the case least subject to control. Once having adopted a standard, resolution may occur only
under threat of or actually revising the standard. This situation can be anticipated by assuring that
the risks of participation are minimized and that participation is the broadest reasonably possible.
See infra Part V.
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Adopting any model that includes disclosure will only prolong the existing
uncertainty that plagues standard-setting today. Participant-patentees will
continue to sue for infringement arising from standards in which they participated
but made less than a complete disclosure of all their IP interests. Participantdefendants will continue to struggle to define a remedial structure, and the FTC
pursuit of antitrust remedies will continue to evolve, infusing standard-setting
with continuing uncertainty. SSOs will continue to maintain unenforceable
intellectual property policies.3" 6
No commentator has made such a proposal." 7 Jettisoning the disclosure
requirement is not merely a way to avoid a difficult issue. Some advocate clear
communication and enforceability of the duty to disclose;3.. however, that result
is not possible. While well intentioned, the duty to disclose presents many
business and legal risks. It is a victory of form over substance. SSOs use this
3 9
duty as a means to protect against antitrust liability. " The FTC makes clear in
the Dellconsent decree that a disclosure policy is not necessary to protect SSOs
against antitrust liability.310 In other words, the FTC does not increase its scrutiny
of standard-setting processes, which do not involve a duty to disclose. The
Rambus complaint does not alter that duty.3 11 In Unocal the FTC attempted to
312
imply a duty to disclose where CARB itself did not impose the duty.

306Judge Rader put this issue in perspective in his Rambus decision:

In this case there is a staggering lack of defining details in the EIA/JEDEC
patent policy. When direct competitors participate in an open standards
committee, their work necessitates a written patent policy with clear guidance on
the committee's intellectual property. A policy that does not define clearly what,
when, how, and to whom the members must disclose does not provide a firm
basis for the disclosure duty necessary for a fraud verdict. Without a clear policy,
members form vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the policy
requires-whether the policy in fact so requires or not. JEDEC could have
drafted a patent policy with a broader disclosure duty. It could have drafted a
policy broad enough to capture a member's failed attempts to mine a disclosed
specification for broader undisclosed claims. It could have. It simply did not.
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102,65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1720 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
" Prof. Lemley has proposed that SSOs "eschew" the duty to disclose unless the duty is tied to
an obligation to license. Lemley, supra note 30, at 1960-62. On the other hand, I propose that the
duty to disclose be jettisoned and that a detailed license must be negotiated before the standardsetting deliberations begin.
308 Id at 1957-59.
See supra text accompanying note 46.
310 See In rn Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
See Abbott & Gebhard, supranote 192.
312 Complaint of the FTC at 17-18, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 4,2003),
availab/e at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9305/index.htm.
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On the other hand, SSOs have not acted to make the duty to disclose
enforceable.313 The SSOs may suspect that if they make the conditions of
participation clear and enforceable, the supply of willing participants may dwindle
due to the risk to the participant's intellectual property rights. Thus, I propose
that the duty to disdose be eliminated as an obligation for participation in
standard-setting processes.
The advantages of eliminating standard-setting from the duty to disclose are
inversely proportional to the disadvantages of maintaining that duty. The duty to
disclose is burdensome. Standard-setting is ill served by any model that causes
participant-licensees in the standard-setting process to rely on the existence of a
duty to disclose, only to later discover after investing to comply with the adopted
standard that the protections intended to follow from a duty to disclose failed.
Determining whether a participant has lived up to a duty to disclose is not
possible absent a suit or a participant's blanket disclosure.314 To be meaningful
and enforceable, an SSO must describe its duty to disclose with sufficient clarity
so that a suit could be successfully brought for breach of the duty alone. But
defining that contractual duty is not possible for the following reasons.
The current system is affected by the timing of disclosure. The less mature the
standard, the broader the reach of the duty to disclose.315 The more mature the
standard, the more focused the reach of the duty.316 In either case, the duty to
disclose burdens the participants to search their IP inventories. The larger the IP
inventory of the participant, the larger the search burden. The later the duty
arises, and SSOs commonly require disclosure as part of the balloting process, the
less the search burden.
SSO disclosure requirements do not normally require participants to perform
the search.31 The search burden may contribute to a systematic inertia, operating
against adopting another standard in the presence of disclosed patent rights. The
search burden is increased by the difficulties in establishing the scope of the
patents that would be subject to the duty to disclose.
313 See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1957.
314 Taken to an extreme, an SSO could require the participants to maintain a list of each

member's patents that fall within the charter of the SSO itself or of individual committees. This
approach would impose an onerous burden on all participants, and an even more onerous burden
on those participants with large IP portfolios. In adopting such a requirement, the SSO would have
to burden all participants with the additional requirement of keeping the list up to date.
Confidentiality and patent prosecution concerns would make any such idea impractical.
315 The broader the reach, the greater the burden of disclosure or the more likely to expose
confidential information.
316 In this context, "less mature" means earlier in the deliberations. A more mature
standard is
one closer to adoption, with greater definition and a narrower scope.
317 Lemley, supra note 30, at 1905 ("Curiously, very few of the SSO rules I studied require a
member to search either its own files or the broader literature to identify relevant IP rights.").
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Claim interpretation presents another obstacle to any meaningful duty to
disclose. Claim interpretation is anything but predictable. District courts
commonly hold Markman hearings in patent infringement cases, and one party or
both parties appeal the interpretation to the Federal Circuit as a matter of
course.318 However, any description of the duty to disclose must clarify whether
the doctrine of equivalents will form a basis of claim interpretation. Claim
interpretation under the doctrine of equivalents is significantly more uncertain
than claim interpretation for literal infringement.319
SSO policies do not clearly confront whether the duty to disclose is limited to
patents or whether it reaches patent applications.3 2' The same concerns that give
rise to any duty to disclose patents, such as conferring inflated valuation and
ceding control over the standard to one participant, exist in the case of patent
applications. The same uncertainties attendant to identifying implicated patents
exist when the duty to disclose encompasses patent applications. During PTO
examination, the claims included in the original application may change
dramatically. Claim interpretation is difficult when the claims themselves are
uncertain.
Additionally, a participant's disclosure of the existence of a patent application
may expose information otherwise held confidentially by that participant. That
is, disclosure by its very nature reveals to competitors the direction and relative
321
The JEDEC
success of that participant's research and development program.
disclosure policy encompasses patent applications but does not provide a
reciprocal assurance of confidentiality, even though the participant-applicant
would disclose to its competitor-participants.322

31" See Markman v. Westfield Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996)

(holding that claim interpretation is a matter of law); see also Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 13536.
319 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1263, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1977) ("Application of the doctrine of equivalents may allow a patentee to
recover for infringement though the accused device falls outside the literal scope of the claims if the
differences between the claimed invention and the device are insubstantial.").
320 The literature commonly advocates that patent applications be included. JEDEC calls for
disclosure of patent applications. JOINT ELECIFRON DEVICE ENG'G COUNCIl., JEDEC PATENT
POLICY, supra note 48. In contrast, ANSI's policy is not so clear. AM. NAT'I. STANDARDS INST.,
supra note 48. See Cowie & LaVelle, supra note 45, at 134-35.
321 The same concerns that underlie disclosing patent applications also underlie disclosure of a
participant's ongoing research for which it has not applied for a patent. A manipulating firm could
delay applying for a patent until the standard is adopted in the manner that it may continue a patent
application. Interestingly, the duty to disclose does not appear to be conditioned upon the execution
of a nondisclosure agreement by the recipient-participants.
'22 JOINT EIErcIRON DEVICE ENG'G COUNCiL,JEDEC PATENT POI.]CY, supra note 48.
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Also, in the case of patent applications, the duty to disclose must describe the
information that will satisfy the duty. Rambus's disclosure of a common written
description did not satisfy the jury or the FTC.323
An expression of a disclosure duty must make clear whether the duty reaches
only the personal knowledge of the representative or whether it extends to the
company itself. The expression of the duty in Dellappeared to be personal, and
the FTC made no allegation that the representative had personal knowledge of
Dell's patent, but the FTC's case was predicated upon the failure of the company
to disclose.3 24 Also, a meaningful description of the duty to disclose must define
whether an affiliate's, subsidiary's, or parent's patents are included in a
participant's duty to disclose.
The opinion of the Federal Circuit in Rambus is particularly instructive as to
the shortcomings inherent in any duty to disclose.325 Judge Rader noted that the
policies of JEDEC and its parent, the former Electronic Industries Association
(EIA), called upon the Committees to "ensure that no program of standardization
shall refer to a product on which there is a known patent unless all the relevant
technical information covered by the patent is known. 3 26 Judge Rader observed
that "[t]he language of these policy statements actually does not impose any direct
duty on members. 3 2' For the purpose of the opinion, because the participants
"treated the language of Appendix E as imposing a disclosure duty," the court
accepted that duty.3 28 The Federal Circuit opinion considered the extent of
Rambus's duty to disclose and concluded, based upon the testimony ofInfineon's
witnesses, that the scope of the duty was limited to a patent that would have been
infringed by the standard.329 Judge Rader noted that Rambus disclosed the patent
in September 1993 and, although that patent was not in issue, it shared the same
written description, verbatim, with the patents that were in issue.330 That
disclosure would, therefore, satisfy a broader reading of the duty.33 '
Judge Rader interpreted that duty in regard to claim construction and found
that:

121
Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1085.
324 In re
Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C. at 617.
1'5 Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d 1081.
126

Id. at 1097.

327

Id at 1098.

328 Id
321

Id at 1100.

31 Id at 1099.
31 Id at 1100. This introduces yet another shortcoming in any expression of the duty to disclose.

What is sufficient disclosure of a patent application: the written description, the claims, or the entire
application?
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The disclosure duty operates when a reasonable competitor would
not expect to practice the standard without a license under the
undisclosed claims. Stated another way, there must be some
reasonable expectation that a license is needed to implement the
standard. By the same token, the disclosure duty does not arise for
a claim that recites individual limitations directed to a feature of the
JEDEC standard as long as that claim also includes limitations not
needed to practice the standard. This is so because the claim could
not reasonably be read to cover the standard or require a license to
practice the standard.
To hold otherwise would contradict the record evidence and
render the JEDEC disclosure duty unbounded.332
The Federal Circuit opinion went on to consider when the duty to disclose arises
and held that, based upon the testimony of Infineon's witnesses, the substantial
evidence supported only a conclusion that "the disclosure duty is triggered when
work formally begins on a proposed standard" and the policy requires "disclosure
of certain 'patents or pending patents'-not
disclosure of a member's intentions
333
to file or amend patent applications."
The opinion reversed the denial of Rambus's JMOL by the district court,
noting:
[t]he record shows that Rambus' claimed technology did not fall
within the JEDEC disclosure duty. The record shows at most that
Rambus wanted to obtain claims covering the SDRAM standard.
Some of that evidence does not put Rambus in the best light.
Rambus thought it could cover the SDRAM standard and tried to
do so while a member of an open standard-setting committee.
While such actions impeach Rambus' business ethics, the record
does not contain substantial evidence
that Rambus breached its
334
duty under the EIA/JEDEC policy.

112

Id. at 1100-01.

13

Id at 1102.

" Id.
at 1104. Judge Prost dissented from the fraud portion of the decision. She reached
different conclusions as to the breadth of the duty, and the timing of the duty. Id.
at 1108. Her
dissent underscores the various legal conclusions that can be drawn from the same record in defining
the duty to disclose in private standard-setting.
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BEFORE

The second component of the standard-setting participation model advanced
by this Article is the requirement that the participants in a standard-setting
process negotiate a detailed license before the standard-setting deliberations begin.
The purpose of this requirement is to take advantage of the uncertainty that exists
at the outset of deliberations. The result of this requirement would be ex ante
pricing, which will allow the owner of patents implicated in the adopted standard
to receive value in the market place for the patent's technological contribution,
but does not allow the owner to hold up its participant-licensees where the owner
has been the beneficiary of the adopted standard. The next section discusses the
considerations that underlie the negotiation strategies and then describes the
terms of a model license drafted to achieve the benefits identified throughout this
Article.
1. Negotiating Considerations. The negotiation model advocated here would
involve all the participants to a proposed standard-setting. The participants
would undertake the negotiations prior to beginning the deliberations over the
standard. The participants, not the SSOs, are best positioned to value the
standard in the marketplace.
The timing of the negotiations is crucial in avoiding expost pricing inflation.
This Article's proposal takes advantage of the fact that, at the outset of the
process, no participant would know whether it would be a licensor or a licensee.
This uncertainty would best moderate the ultimately negotiated royalty. Each
participant would negotiate recognizing the possibility that some other
participant's technology may be adopted as the standard and that it will be a
licensee.
Firms that choose not to participate would abdicate an opportunity to
advocate their technology, which could ultimately cover the entire standard or
some portion of it. None of the current proposals deal with nonparticipants,
except to recognize that discriminatory licensing would increase the prospect of
antitrust scrutiny.
Once the licenses have been negotiated, each participant would execute the
license. Manipulating the standard-setting process by resigning becomes useless
for several reasons. First, each participant will have licensed any implicated
patents for the purpose of practicing the standard. Secondly, each participant will
be bound for the term of the license even if it were to resign from the particular
standard-setting process. If a participant resigns before the license is negotiated,
it loses the opportunity to advocate its technology, thus substantially reducing the
probability that its technology will be implicated in the ultimately adopted
standard.
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The proposal advocated by this Article provides that nonparticipants would
be eligible for a license to the standard on the same terms as the participants. The
nonparticipant must offer rights to any implicated invention it owns on the same
terms as the license negotiated by the participants. The parties would be no worse
off than they are under the current model when a standard implicates a patent
owned by a nonparticipant that does not wish to execute the license negotiated
for the standard-setting.
2. Advantages. Negotiating a detailed license before the deliberations begin has
several advantages. First among them is that the license will be negotiated on an
ex ante basis, removing the inflationary expost pricing,but, as opposed to royalty
free licensing, allowing the patent owner royalty income. It further avoids the
undefined RAND license and its inherent pressure for expost pricing.
Second, the scope of the license will be limited to the use of the technology
involved in the standard. Therefore, all those who sign the license would be
protected when practicing the standard. Third, as opposed to all the proposals
previously discussed, the model license is not dependent upon one patent
owner. 33 1 More than one patent may be implicated in the standard. Fourth, the
model license is open to all, even parties that did not participate in the standardsetting process on the condition that the prospective non-participating licensee
is willing to sign the negotiated license agreeing to provide reciprocal rights in any
of its patents that are implicated in the standard. Fifth, the use of the model
license advocated by this Article would provide a meaningful beginning to the
negotiations. The negotiation of the detailed license will not unduly delay or
inhibit the beginning of deliberations over the standard. As the model advocated
here is practiced and gains acceptance, a version of a license may evolve that
would further refine a standard-setting licensing agreement. In such a case, the
negotiation of a licensing agreement would focus essentially on the royalty, since
have gained broad acceptance, further
would
the other terms and conditions 33
6
speeding the negotiation process.
335See Curran, supra note

22, at 984 n.3 who states:
The phrase 'single source' is used herein as a limiting principle, allowing price
bargaining to occur only between SSOs and a single patent owner. Accordingly,
the single-source rule would exclude pooled, jointly owned, or cross-licensed
proprietary technologies from the proposed system of bargaining and price-fixing
(although the rule would not exclude bargaining over multiple patents originating
from a single source). This limitation is necessary to prevent SSO capture by
multiple market participants; without a single source rule, the proposed system
of patent price bargaining could quickly turn SSOs into vehicles for
anticompetitive harm.
I disagree that the conclusion follows and have included in my proposal a provision for multiple
patents and the circumstance that the implicated standards do not cover the adopted standard.
311Id. at 1005 ("The solution outlined above is subject to two major criticisms: First, that the
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Finally, good faith use of this model would avoid antitrust scrutiny and result
in standard-setting's being even more procompetitive. The negotiations would
take place when the parties are least likely to know whether they will be a licensor
or a licensee. The pricing would become more competitive, essentially ex ante.
The license would be open, both as to participants and nonparticipants. The
scope of the license would provide a complete defense in an infringement suit by
a participant or subsequent licensee for practicing the standard. So long as the
parties negotiate in good faith prior to adoption of the standard, and so long as
the standard the license is open, the risk of any antitrust scrutiny would be
minimal.
C. MODEL TERMS FOR AN SSO LICENSING AGREEMENT

The FTC has approved many of the terms of this model license in its
consideration of proposed pool licenses for MPEG-2 compression technology
pool licenses, 337 a proposal for the manufacture of Digital Versatile Discs (DVD)
Video formats338 and a
and players in compliance with DVD-ROM and DVD
339
pool.
format
second DVD-ROM and DVD-Video
Pool licensing situations and standard-setting are very similar situations. 4
Standard-setting presents pro-competitive benefits beyond those of pool licenses.
A pool license is "an agreement of two or more owners of different items of
intellectual property to license one another or third parties." 34 1 Pool licensing

proposed bargaining process would create undue delays in the standard-setting process, and second,
that a system of price bargaining would reduce incentives to innovate and develop improved
proprietary technologies."). Curran notes that delays exist in the current system. Id at 1005. If all
participants were interested in getting on with the standard-setting to get products to market,
however, there is a built in incentive to move along, particularly when one party would not know the
technologies held by the others and whether it would end up a licensor or licensee.
...Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq.,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, June 26, 1997, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
busreview/1170.htm.
.. Letter fromJoel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan &
Crowell LLP, Dec. 16, 1998, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121 .htm.
...Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., Paul, Weiss,
Rifldnd,Wharton & Garrison LLP, June 10, 1999, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
busreview/2485.htm.
ui Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 454.
3' U.S. DiE'T OF JuSnci & FTC, ANTnTuSi GuIDiw.I1NF.S FzO) TH. LICi-NSING OF
IN'IT:I .1.FTI*U,\I .PR)PERTY, supranote 43, at 26 ("These arrangements may provide procompeitive
benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking
positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. By promoting the dissemination of
technology, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements are often procompetitive."); see id at 26-28 for
further discussion; see also Balto & Wolman, supranote 25, at 445-53.
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presents a greater risk of collusive conduct than a standard-setting environment.34 2
Participation in the negotiation of the model licenses advocated in this Article
would not be limited to those that have implicated technology or those that
participated in the development of the standard.
I advocate the same level of scrutiny for the negotiation of standard-setting
licenses. Should the parties act collusively, antitrust enforcement is warranted.
However, if the SSO and the participants use the model advocated here, there is
no need to act collusively and risk antitrust scrutiny.
1. Scope. The license advocated here would define the scope as those patents
then owned by or subsequently issued to the signatories that are necessary to
practice the ultimately adopted standard.343 The parties would negotiate separately
for uses that are outside the scope of the license. This means that even for an
implicated patent, if a participant would like to use the patent for a purpose not
necessary for practicing the standard, that participant would not be able to rely on
the license outlined here but would have to negotiate a separate license with the
patent owner.
The license should impose "no obligation on the licensee to use only the
licensed patent and explicitly leave[] the licensee free to independently develop
'
The license should make clear that if a patent is
[alternative products]."344
invalidated or expires it would no longer be subject to the license.34
2. Open license. The license would be open to any nonparticipant willing to
assume its obligations,346 that is, the license would be available to any party willing
to sign it and thereby provide reciprocal rights in any implicated patent the
nonparticipant may own. This arrangement would reduce antitrust concerns
find closed standards suspect,34 and
about collusion, since antitrust authorities
348
open standards relieve those concerns.
Use of an open licensing structure as advocated here would negate any need
to deal with a right to sublicense in the license. Any potential sublicensee could

Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard A. Beeney, supra note 337, at 7.
...
Disagreements may arise over the term "necessary," as a question of whether the invention
represents a preferred embodiment or economic efficiencies or alternative approaches. Experience
will provide the best answers to such questions. Drawing on the model from the MPEG-2 pool, the
license could call for the designation of "an independent expert as an arbiter of essentiality." See id
at 3.
344Id at 4.
"sId. at 5.
34' Lemley, supra note 30, at 1916 ("Assuming both conditions are met, it does seem just to
permit both members and nonmembers to benefit from enforcement of the license.").
342See

347Balto, supra note 23, at 4-6.
341Id at 6.
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instead become a licensee. The open license would also avoid any need to limit
parties.349
3. Term. The license should establish a fixed term which is appropriate under
35
antitrust law in light of the technology that will be the subject of the standard.
The term should not coincide with the term of the patent. Should the adopted
standard subsequently be replaced or modified, those patent owners whose
patents are no longer implicated in the standard would no longer be covered
under the license as a licensor but would continue to be protected as a licensee for
those patents of others that continue to be implicated in the standard.
4. Royaly. The participants in the standard-setting would negotiate a defined
royalty following the considerations discussed supra.3"' The royalty negotiated by
the participants could vary from royalty free to a value based royalty; however,
because the negotiations would take place before the standard is identified, the
likelihood of the negotiation of an ex ante royalty is substantially increased. The
royalty would be paid only to the participant(s) whose patents are implicated in
the standard, and, where that is more than one participant, the license would
contain a provision, as discussed infra, for prorating the negotiated royalty. The
participants' valuation would be superior to that which could be negotiated by the
SSOs. RAND licensing results in ex post valuation. Unocol and Rambus
demonstrate the effect in the market when a participant manipulates a standard352
setting process and exacts the maximum royalty.
So long as the parties operate in good faith, the results will be procompetitive.
Good faith here means that the negotiations would not be collusive, would not
allocate markets, and would not introduce restrictions or otherwise limit
competition.353 Anticompetitive concerns are dampened substantially in that
licenses are open and limited to the standard. The negotiations should be judged
on actual results and the process.

...Curran, supra note 22, at 991 states:
When firms collaborate to set product standards, they face an important choice
about the type of standard they want to adopt. Technical standards come in two
flavors: 'open' standards, which are not controlled by any one party and can be
adopted freely by all market participants; and 'closed' or proprietary standards,
which may be used only with the permission of the standard owner.
See also Balto, supra note 23, at 6.
", Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard A. Beeney, supra note 337, at 4.
351 See supra Part V.B.1 for a discussion of negotiation considerations.
'52 Seegeneral# Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705
(Fed. Cit. 2003); In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar 4, 2003), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.htm).
,51 See U.S. DHiT'T op Jus'I'Ine & FTC, ANTIRusT GUIDIw.INES FOR THE LICnNSING OF
INTI.I.1B.C'UAI. PitoPi.IlY, supra note 43, at 17-23.
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An issue of royalty sharing arises when more than one company owns patents
implicated under the standard. Based upon an idea derived from the pool
licenses,3" 4 I advocate a royalty provision that provides for the designation of a
technically qualified neutral arbiter to break the negotiated royalty into component
shares when more than one company owns the patents, or prorates the negotiated
royalty to the party or parties that have patents implicated but which do not cover
the entire standard.
The negotiated royalty would assume that one or more participants would
have patents that cover the entire standard; that is, the entire royalty would be
payable only to the extent that one or more participant's patents cover the entire
standard. Should that prove not to be the case, the royalty allocation process
would allocate only that portion of the royalty covered by the participants'
patents, with the remainder of the royalty not to be paid unless a subsequent
signatory or signatories have patents that cover the remainder of the standard.
Only participants that own patents would receive a share of the royalty. Those
participants that do not own implicated patents would not share in the royalty
allocation but would benefit from an ex ante royalty, a defined scope of license,
and vastly increased certainty in practicing the standard.
5. Grantback. Another option is negotiation of a grantback clause, which
provides for the participants to license subsequent improvements of the standard
to both the initial and subsequent signatories."' Once outside the standard, the
standard-setting license would no longer control. This provision is subject to
antitrust scrutiny by reducing licensees' incentives to innovate."' In cases in
which the grantback and underlying license are of limited duration and not
coercive, such a provision may well benefit the standard-setting process and pass
357
antitrust scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION

Standard-setting is increasingly important in facilitating fast-paced
technological development and increasing competition in today's world. At this
time, when SSOs are recognized as an asset in our economy, the uncertainty
surrounding their activities has increased to an extent that endangers their

"' See Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard A. Beeney, supra note 337, at 4.
3' See Balto & Wolman, supra note 25, at 437-38.
.
See U.S. DE'r oi Jusnci(. & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDIIANF.S FOR THIE LiCINSING OF
INTIiI.FZI'UAI, PROlR', supra note 43, at 28-29; see also Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard A.
Beeney, supra note 338, at 8.
117 See Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard A. Beeney, supra note 338, at 8-9.
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effectiveness and may cause companies to reduce their involvement in standardsetting activities.
The current model for participation in standard-setting relies on a vague and
toothless duty to disclose and a further duty to license implicated technology on
either a royalty-free or reasonable terms and conditions basis. Three recent cases
have exposed the defects in the current model.
The standard-setting process would be well-served to adopt the
comprehensive model advocated by this Article. The new model would eliminate
the duty to disclose. In doing so, this proposal would remove the uncertainties
and significant risks associated with that duty.
The proposal advanced here would further require the negotiation of a defined
license between the participants, and prior to deliberations, to adopt a standard.
This Article also describes the critical provisions of such a license and offers
authority for satisfaction of antitrust scrutiny.
First, the proposed license would define the scope of the license as any IP
necessary to practice the adopted standard. Second, the license would be open,
allowing the licensing of non-participating parties to practice the standard by
which the non-participant would reciprocally license any of its IP necessary to
practice the standard. Third, the proposed license would establish a defined
royalty for implicated IP. The royalty would most resemble ex ante valuation
because, at the time the royalty is negotiated, the standard would not be known
and no participant would know whether it would end up being the licensor or the
licensee. Fourth, the license would be for a fixed term or the term of the
standard, whichever is less. Fifth, the model license discusses a grantback
provision.
The adoption of this model will remove the current uncertainty and provide
standard-setting participants confidence in their decision to participate. By
facilitating current levels of participation or increasing them, SSOs and
participants may pursue their beneficial purposes confidently.
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